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DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF CIVIL RIGHTS
LIBERALISM: VISIONS OF RACIAL JUSTICE
IN THE THOUGHT OF T. THOMAS FORTUNE,
1880–1890
Susan D. Carle*
INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses the development of American understandings of the
various roles of lawyers in building democracy by focusing on legal reform
efforts in the American civil rights movement. In recent years, the
supposed achievements of that movement have come under attack as part of
a critique of the ideology of legal liberalism. That critique argues that civil
rights lawyers and other activists too greatly emphasized court-focused
strategies aimed at achieving what would turn out to be Pyrrhic “civil”
rights victories—i.e., gains solely in “formal” equality through
requirements enshrined in law as to how the state must treat its citizens.1
No case has received more attention as part of this critique of legal
liberalism in the civil rights movement than the National Association for the
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. First and foremost, I
would like to thank Adeen Postar and Y. Renee Tally-Cutbert of the Pence Law Library at
the Washington College of Law for invaluable research and interlibrary loan assistance on
this and other related projects. Without that help, this essay and the larger project of which it
is a part could never have been undertaken. I am also grateful to Shawn Leigh Alexander for
his expert comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to independent scholar Daniel
Weinfeld for his generosity in sharing with me his transcriptions of T. Thomas Fortune’s
autobiographical articles in the Norfolk Journal and Guide and his insights on Fortune and
his historical context. I owe great thanks to research assistants Farhan Ali, Aaron Brand,
Matt Hill, Whitney Mancino, and Kathy Tuznik, for excellent research assistance at various
stages of this project’s development. Last but not least, I also wish to thank my colleagues
Lewis Grossman and Darren Hutchinson for their incisive comments on earlier drafts, and
Richard Abel, Robert Gordon, and all of the participants in the Fordham Law School
Symposium on The Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary Democracy for helpful feedback.
1. As one leading scholar puts it, legal liberalism’s core elements have become
familiar:
courts as the primary engines of social transformation; formal conceptual
categories such as rights, and formal remedies such as school desegregation
decrees, as the principal mechanisms for accomplishing that change; and a focus
on reforming public institutions (or, in some versions, public and private
institutions without much distinction) as a means of transforming the larger
society.
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown,
115 YALE L.J. 256, 258 (2005).
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Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) 1954 litigation victory in
Brown v. Board of Education.2 The fiftieth anniversary of that case saw an
outpouring of critical literature questioning Brown’s supposed
accomplishments.3 As the critics who generated that literature pointed out,
racial justice is far from a reality today despite the dismantling of de jure
discrimination.4 Indeed, economic indicators suggest that some disparities
based on race have in fact grown larger in recent decades.5

2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004) (arguing that Brown was a
catalyst for resistance to racial integration); WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL
RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter RETHINKING BROWN] (collecting
leading constitutional scholars’ drafts of proposed alternative opinions in Brown); Kevin
Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the Dual Harm of Segregation, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1579, 1598 (2004) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown for delineating the
psychological ramifications of segregation as they affected African Americans while
disregarding the effects segregation had on whites, an alternative rationale that would have
made desegregation more palatable to the majority group); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown v. Board of Education (Our
No-Bell Price Award Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 473, 492 (2004) (claiming civil rights
breakthroughs occurred, not as a direct result of Brown, but due to pressure by elite groups
and American self-interest during the cold war); Donald E. Lively, The Desegregation
Legacy: Uncertain Achievement and Doctrinal Distress, 47 HOW. L.J. 679, 700 (2004)
(arguing that the rationale in Brown lacked strong legitimacy); Mark Tushnet, Some
Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 1707–08 (2004) (claiming
that Brown did not change white attitudes on race, but did indirectly affect national
perspectives on racial equality).
4. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in RETHINKING BROWN, supra note 3, at 3,
12 (“In the half century since Brown, it is clear that although the elimination of Jim Crow
has done much good, blacks as a group still lag behind whites in many of the most important
social measures of well-being and success—household income, infant mortality, life
expectancy, educational opportunity, and employment levels.”).
5. One recent study concludes that middle-class African Americans are in fact
economically worse off and have made negative progress as compared to whites in economic
terms since the civil rights revolution. See JULIA B. ISAACS, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF BLACK AND WHITE FAMILIES 4 (2008) (summarizing results of a
longitudinal survey finding that two of three white children from middle-income families
grow up to have higher real family incomes than their parents while only one out of three
African American children from the same income group surpass their parents in absolute
income levels). In 2005, the per capita income of African Americans was $16,629 as
compared to $28,946 for whites, and the disparity between the average wealth of African
Americans as compared to whites was even more extreme. See DEDRICK MUHAMMAD, THE
INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, 40 YEARS LATER: THE UNREALIZED AMERICAN DREAM 9 (2008).
The poverty rate for African Americans is 24.3% as compared to 8.2% for non-Hispanic
whites. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PEOPLE AND FAMILIES IN POVERTY BY SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS: 2005 AND 2006 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
poverty/poverty06/table3.pdf. The homeownership rate among African Americans in 2007
was 47.2% as compared to 75.2% for non-Hispanic whites. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING
VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP–ANNUAL 2007: TABLE 20 (2007), http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/ann07t20.html. The subprime mortgage crisis has also hit
African Americans with disproportionate severity. See generally AMAAD RIVERA ET AL.,
UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., FORECLOSED: STATE OF THE DREAM 2008, at 1 (2008), available
at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/cdfis/report-rivera-et-al.pdf.
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Even before Brown’s anniversary, scholars built careers slaying the
sacred cow of Brown adulation. Political scientist Gerald Rosenberg
concluded in 1991, on the basis of his extensive empirical study of
newspaper accounts and other evidence, that Brown’s impact had been
drastically overrated.6 In law, Michael Klarman’s prize-winning work
developed a thesis along similar lines.7 Klarman’s magnificent survey of
the history of the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence argues that in important
respects Brown was counterproductive to the civil rights cause because the
Court’s ruling provoked a vicious backlash among resisting communities in
the South and elsewhere.8 Klarman believes that much of what the Brown
litigators hoped to achieve would probably have happened more quickly
and smoothly through alternative means.9
This critical literature aimed at reassessing Brown responds to an earlier
generation of Brown hagiography within legal academia, which was fond of
invoking Brown to extol the virtues of the American legal system and its
courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court and its allegedly laudable
protection of civil and political rights.10 The critique of liberal legal
academics’ ideological agenda was well deserved. But attacks on legal
liberalism within legal academia should not be allowed to distort
evaluations of the aims of the civil rights movement itself—at least without

6. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 156 (2d ed. 2008) (1991). According to Gerald Rosenberg, the “claim that a major
contribution of courts in civil rights was to give the issue salience, press political elites to
act, prick the consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances of blacks, and fire blacks up to
act is not substantiated.” Id. Instead, his evidence suggests that “Brown’s major positive
impact was limited to reinforcing the belief in a legal strategy for change of those already
committed to it.” Id. Among Brown’s negative effects, Rosenberg finds that it “unleashed a
wave of racism that reached hysterical proportions,” was “used as a club by Southerners to
fight any civil rights legislation,” and “stiffen[ed] resistance and rais[ed] fears” so that it
“may actually have delayed the achievement of civil rights.” Id. at 155–56. It was instead a
combination of other factors that created the pressures that eventually led to civil rights
revolution; “the Court reflected that pressure; it did not create it.” Id. at 169.
7. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
8. Id. at 385–442.
9. Id. at 392, 397. Arguments that less confrontational tactics would better achieve the
goals of the civil rights movement have long historical roots, just as arguments in favor of
militant approaches do. See Victor Michael Glasberg, The Emergence of White Liberalism:
The Founders of the NAACP and American Racial Attitudes 33–34 (May 1971)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (noting that most white liberals at the turn of the twentieth century counseled
moderation and small steps on the path of racial progress in lieu of militancy, which they
argued would have backlash effects in hardening racial divisions).
10. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117 (1991) (praising the
Warren Court’s interpretation of Brown); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2, 9, 12, 14, 29–30 (1979) (discussing
Brown in laudatory terms as a decision that led to social change, procedural innovation, and
a true account of the “constitutional value of equality”). For an excellent examination of
legal liberalism generally, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
(1996).
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first seeking to understand those aims by taking a long view on the
movement for racial justice.
In this essay, I seek to promote taking such a long view of the movement
for racial justice by evaluating the legal liberal critique of that movement in
relation to an important early leader: T. Thomas Fortune, a law-educated
militant journalist, public intellectual, and organizer who has been largely
forgotten by legal scholars today. In 1887, Fortune founded the AfroAmerican League (AAL), a national organization that was short-lived but
nevertheless played an important historical role in the transmission of ideas
to later groups including the Afro-American Council; the Niagara
Movement, which was W. E. B. Du Bois’s more militant but also shortlived organization consisting of professional African American men, or his
“talented tenth”; and then, five years later, the biracial NAACP. Fortune’s
multidimensional view of the struggle for racial justice embraced a number
of ideas we tend to see as distinct or even opposing today. As I will discuss
below, Fortune supported reactive court battles and proactive legislative
reform; establishment of equal civil and political rights and an ultimate goal
of economic justice; and intrarace self-help and interracial coalition politics
aimed at eliminating poverty for all persons regardless of race. Examining
Fortune’s ideas helps remind us that the history of the American civil rights
struggle was more complex and multidimensional than the legal-liberal
gloss remembers today.11
This essay seeks to contribute to a developing literature that is
reassessing the nature of the ideological commitments, as well as
understandings about the interaction between law and social change, of race
activists who pioneered methods that in time led to Brown and then to the
direct action civil rights campaigns of the 1960s.12 I focus my attention on
11. Cf. THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2007) (exploring Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s, efforts to reclaim and further develop ideas connecting racial and economic justice).
12. Many scholars, writing from many perspectives, have begun to show that the
activists involved in work for racial justice that eventually led to Brown were not intent on
the visions of legal liberalism now under attack. Ken Mack has brilliantly excavated the
intragroup self-help concerns of African American lawyers working on the cause of racial
justice from the 1930s to 50s. See Mack, supra note 1, at 277 (discussing the “voluntaristautonomy view” among African American lawyers during the interwar era, which was
“explicitly anti-legalist and emphasized black autonomy and voluntary private arrangements
among African-Americans as the best guarantor of equality in American life,” and which
held that “blacks should be suspicious, or at least skeptical, of the ability of innovations in
either public or private law to guarantee equality with whites”). Mack explains that this
view coexisted with “a legalist strand that centered on moral and legal claims directed to the
larger white majority,” translated into the “language of law.” Id. at 280 & n.75.
Risa Goluboff has written persuasively about case investigations, litigation, and
other activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1930s and 40s that sought legal avenues
to secure labor and economic rights for African American workers. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF,
THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). Goluboff emphasizes the “lost promise” of the
civil rights movement’s interest in these years on developing litigation theories to boost
economic as well as political and civil rights. See, e.g., id. at 6 (explaining that her book
explores the potential of black workers’ claims “to spur the creation of new civil rights
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a period that has not yet received much attention in connection with this reevaluation of the civil rights movement within legal scholarship: the late
nineteenth century, and, in particular, the decade of the 1880s.13 As I will
discuss further below, this decade saw the first articulation of test case
litigation as a strategy for building a national civil rights organization.14
Investigating the ideas motivating these activists’ plans shows that some
conceptions today associated with legal liberalism were central to race
activists’ agenda during that decade. Other ideas also important in this
period have dropped out of the discourse constructed by legal-liberal Brown
hagiographers. Those ideas include early versions of a voluntarist, selfhelp, and intrarace uplift emphasis,15 as well as ideas about achieving

doctrines”); id. at 13 (noting that the book’s goal is “to highlight the consequences of
lawyers’ strategic litigation choices about which cases to pursue and which to avoid, which
harms to emphasize and which to ignore”); id. at 14 (arguing that lawyers should not only
have established “norm[s] of racial nondiscrimination” but also “rights to work, to join a
union, to participate in the labor market, [and] to minimal subsistence”).
Glenda Gilmore, examining newly accessible files in former Soviet Union archives,
has demonstrated how important were race activists with Communist Party ties, as well as
other fellow radical travelers, to building grassroots efforts for racial justice. See generally
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919–
1950 (2008).
In a book soon to be published, Tomiko Brown-Nagin describes how radical lawyers
and other militants who led the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) directaction sit-ins in Atlanta in the 1960s clashed with older generations of race activist lawyers.
On Brown-Nagin’s account neither of these generations of lawyers held views about the
relationship between courts and socio-legal-political change resembling the legal liberalist
caricature; her story is instead far more complex and interesting. See TOMIKO BROWNNAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: COURTS AND COMMUNITIES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
(forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
13. This period remains underdeveloped with respect to reassessments of the legalliberalist critique of the civil rights movement within legal scholarship, even while the
scholars discussed supra note 12 have done impressive excavations for periods beginning in
the 1920s and later. The significance of this period in setting agendas that would influence
the later directions of organizations devoted to racial justice may remain underappreciated as
well. An earlier generation of towering historians who wrote about the race leaders of the
late nineteenth and first years of the twentieth century developed a grand narrative involving
the dramatic clash between two titans, Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois. See,
e.g., LOUIS R. HARLAN, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: THE WIZARD OF TUSKEGEE, 1901–1915, at
32–106 (1983) (exploring rise of opposition to Washington); AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO
THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880–1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE AGE OF BOOKER T.
WASHINGTON 171–89 (1963) (exploring disputes between the “radicals,” led by Du Bois, and
the “conservatives,” led by Washington). While it is certainly true that these two great
figures did clash and that this clash is important to understanding the period, there was far
more going on that deserves the attention of legal scholars; closer inspection uncovers
material with more nuanced implications than the “grand battle” thesis might suggest.
14. See, e.g., Joseph S. Davis, Letter to the Editor, Baltimore Lawyer’s View of the Case,
N.Y. FREEMAN, July 16, 1887 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (urging Fortune’s
Afro-American League to make as a central priority the litigation of civil rights cases “from
the station house to the Supreme Court”).
15. These are ideas similar to those Mack describes among African American lawyeractivists in the 1930s and after. See Mack, supra note 1, at 281–99; see also MEIER, supra
note 13, at 121–57 (presenting the classic discussion of the historical development of these
ideologies).
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greater economic justice for African Americans16 through attacks on
peonage and convict labor, and ideas about the importance of challenging
systems of economic exploitation generally.17
Yet another now-overlooked idea of central importance to Fortune
emphasized the link between racial justice for African Americans and a just
economic order that minimized poverty and stark inequality for persons of
all races. These ideas were connected to Fortune’s embrace of ideas I will
label “English” socialism, which favored retaining the institutions of
democracy but working through them for government interventions that
would redistribute economic resources and lessen the consequences of
preexisting social and economic inequality.18 Those ideologies as aspects
of the struggle for racial justice did not vanish with the AAL. Indeed,
although this fact has been all but forgotten today, virtually all of the key
founders of the NAACP—both African American and white—were
centrally motivated by similar progressive or democratic socialist political
visions.

16. Trouble spots in language often signal trouble spots in social consciousness, and
terminology around racial identity is no exception. Because T. Thomas Fortune strongly
favored the term Afro-American, I use this term in its updated version when referring to
persons socially identified as being of African descent. When quoting directly from
historical sources, I retain the term used by the author.
17. These are precursors to ideas Goluboff detects in her work examining some of the
NAACP’s projects during the 1930s and 40s. See generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 12.
18. “English” style or democratic socialism existed in many varieties, including
Christian, Fabian, and utopian socialism, and merged into some strains of American
progressivism. In their emphasis on achieving reform through existing democratic
institutions, these perspectives differed from the harder-line, revolutionary socialism of
German thinkers such as Karl Marx and others. See generally RICHARD T. ELY, SOCIALISM:
AN EXAMINATION OF ITS NATURE, ITS STRENGTH AND ITS WEAKNESS, WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR
SOCIAL REFORM (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1894); RICHARD T. ELY, THE SOCIAL
ASPECTS OF CHRISTIANITY (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1889); PETER D’A. JONES,
THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST REVIVAL, 1877–1914: RELIGION, CLASS, AND SOCIAL CONSCIENCE
IN LATE-VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1968).
Strands of populism also strongly influenced the progressive thought of the late
nineteenth century. These influences included a suspicion of the trustworthiness of
enterprises engaged in the large-scale accumulation of capital and a concern about the effect
on the political system of the exercise of such economic power. See generally LAWRENCE
GOODWIN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN
AMERICA (1978) (presenting a classical historical treatment of the populist movement).
These ideas also wove through the political thought of Fortune and other progressives of the
era, including his close friend and fellow race activist T. McCants Stewart. See infra note
116 (discussing Stewart’s biography and political views).
Today, in contrast, predominant ideologies of neoliberalism favor capital
accumulation and distrust redistributive policies. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005). Situated within this very much changed contemporary
mindset, we may easily fail to appreciate how pervasive were very different ideas about
redistribution and curtailing the power of wealth at the turn of the last century. See, e.g.,
Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST.
REV. 577, 585 (2002) (noting the elite Mugwump jurist’s “condem[nation of] the excessive
wealth of the very rich, their corrupt control of the government, and their use of this control
to exploit the working class and poor”).
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As I will show below, Fortune was an early and key contributor to the
development of a political vision linking racial and economic justice.
Having received legal education in the late 1870s, Fortune was able to
produce sophisticated legal analyses that foreshadow critical race theory
and illuminate with particular clarity race activists’ developing thought on
the connection between racial justice and law.19 Not only did he straddle
abolitionism’s equal legal rights discourse and a developing discourse
focusing on racial self-help and in-group advancement, but he also linked
law to far more than the “negative” civil rights vision of legal liberalism.
Fortune conceived of law as a potentially powerful tool for constructing a
just social order with respect to economic relations, as well as civil and
political rights.
Fortune had his most productive and most visionary years as a public
intellectual in the 1880s, and for this reason I focus on that decade in this
essay. Understanding Fortune’s later role becomes much more complex,
for a number of reasons. For one, after the 1880s, Fortune developed an
increasingly close friendship with Booker T. Washington, which eventually
led to Fortune’s financial dependency on and political domination by
Washington.20 The question of precisely when such a dynamic developed
between Fortune and Washington is subject to dispute,21 but beyond the
scope of this essay. Secondly, Fortune struggled with a mental condition
that today would probably be viewed as a tendency to manic depression or a
similar disability; it may indeed be that Fortune’s phenomenal productivity
during the 1880s was related to such a condition. In any event, in 1907,
after years of increasingly acute struggle, Fortune suffered what his
biographer characterizes as a complete nervous “breakdown.”22 At this
point Washington secretly assumed financial control of and ejected Fortune
from the newspaper he had devoted his life to building. Fortune thereafter
lived a tragically reduced life in which he scraped together a living as a
freelance journalist until his death in 1927.23
These aspects of Fortune’s later life require brief mention to avoid
leaving readers with misimpressions about what happened to Fortune after
the conclusion of my narrative here: in shortest summation, the full story of
19. See James M. McPherson, Preface to TIMOTHY THOMAS FORTUNE, BLACK AND
WHITE: LAND, LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH (William Lorez Katz ed., Arno Press &
N.Y. Times 1969) (1884) (describing Fortune’s newspaper as “the leading Negro paper in
the country during the 1880’s and 1890’s”).
20. MEIER, supra note 13, at 227 (“[B]y the early 1890’s [Fortune] and Washington had
developed a close and paradoxical relationship that came to include financial aid . . . .”).
21. Compare id., with Shawn Leigh Alexander, Introduction to T. THOMAS FORTUNE,
THE AFRO-AMERICAN AGITATOR: A COLLECTION OF WRITINGS, 1880–1928, at xi, xxv–xxvi
(Shawn Leigh Alexander ed., 2008) (describing the relationship between Fortune and
Washington as one of mutual advantage).
22. See EMMA LOU THORNBROUGH, T. THOMAS FORTUNE: MILITANT JOURNALIST 305–06
(1972). Fortune also struggled with alcohol dependency. Id. Dating the point at which this
became a serious problem for Fortune is, again, difficult, and not of particular concern to
most of my discussion here. Id.
23. Id. at 323–52.
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his life is a tragic one, in which the extreme stresses of race prejudice and
related issues of financial desperation had terrible consequences on
Fortune’s sensitive and brilliant nature. The difficulty of assessing the sum
total of his contribution given his tragic decline in the later years of his life
may indeed account in substantial part for Fortune’s relative historical
obscurity. But this difficulty does not detract from what is clear and
deserving of far more attention, as I will show below—namely that, in the
militant and creative years of his early career, Fortune functioned as a
leading public intellectual of his time, who, through his efforts to organize
and define the platform for the Afro-American League, laid down important
tenets for race activism that would be transmitted through a series of
subsequent organizations far into the future. For this reason, the study of T.
Thomas Fortune’s thought and activism in the 1880s helps us understand
more about the roots of the modern civil rights movement and suggests
forgotten alternatives that might help define future paths for a movement
for racial and economic justice today.
I proceed as follows. In Part I, I briefly sketch Fortune’s early life,
examine the ideas to which he was exposed through his legal training at
Howard Law School, and describe his early journalism career and his
underlying political philosophy as articulated in his 1884 publication, Black
and White.24 In Part II, I examine in detail Fortune’s journalistic writings
throughout the 1880s with a special focus on what they reveal about
Fortune’s thinking as to the role of law in achieving racial justice.25
Finally, in Part III, I trace the way in which the ideas Fortune developed
through his journalism and other writing ended up in the organizing
platform of the Afro-American League, briefly sketch the history of that
organization as revealed in Fortune’s newspaper accounts, and highlight
some of the salient aspects of the carryover of the League’s platform to
subsequent organizations, including the Niagara Movement and the
NAACP.
I. FORTUNE’S BACKGROUND AND CAREER
A. Early Years26
Timothy Thomas Fortune was born on October 3, 1856, to Emanuel and
Sarah Jane, an enslaved couple, in Marianna, Florida, a small village
24. T. THOMAS FORTUNE, BLACK AND WHITE: LAND, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH
(Wash. Square Press 2007) (1884).
25. To do so, I surveyed all extant copies of Fortune’s newspapers from 1883 to 1890,
and indexed, read, and analyzed approximately 250 articles of most potential relevance in
examining Fortune’s thought about law. I present a summary of my findings based on these
original source materials here.
26. This section’s description is summarized from an excellent biography of Fortune by
Emma Lou Thornbrough. See THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 3–9. For a more recent
biographical treatment along with an excellent representative sampling of Fortune’s
journalism throughout his career, see Alexander, supra note 21, at xi–xxx.
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located in Jackson County in the north of that state.27 Emanuel’s father was
an Irishman, Thomas Fortune, who had been killed in a hot-headed duel
when Emanuel was an infant. His mother was the daughter of a mixed-race
enslaved woman and a Seminole Indian. Emanuel had been raised with the
son of the owner of the plantation on which he was born, and had learned to
read and been taught the trade of shoemaker and tanner. He later had been
“sold” to the man who owned the plantation on which Sarah Jane lived and
ran a tannery for him.28 Sarah Jane’s father was also of Native American
heritage; her mother was the child of a white father and an enslaved African
American mother.29
After Emancipation, Emanuel and Sarah Jane married legally and took
Fortune as their last name. They moved their family of five children to land
owned by Emanuel’s former owner’s son, who had been Emanuel’s
childhood friend. The Fortunes farmed, concentrating on growing cotton,
and supplemented their diet with fishing and hunting.30 Their son, T.
Thomas Fortune, or Tim, as he was then known, recalled his childhood as a
happy, outdoors life.31 He attended a Freedmen’s Bureau school taught by
two Union soldiers in an African American church in Marianna and also
worked in the offices of a community weekly newspaper, where he learned
to “stick” type, a skill that provided him with the “rudiments of the trade
that w[ere] to determine his life work.”32
Emanuel had received a far better education than most freedmen, and
also had natural ability as an orator—a talent both Tim and his brother
Emanuel, Jr. would inherit. This skill suited their father to politics, and
Emanuel, Sr. soon became active in the Republican Party. In 1868, he was
elected a delegate to the Florida Constitutional Convention and then
became a member of the Florida House of Representatives.33 But as the
Reconstruction Era progressed, white violence and animosity in Marianna
grew, and Emanuel and his allies became targets of death threats and an
assassination attempt. As the community descended into violence, the
Fortune family lived through long periods of horror and fear. These
experiences left a lasting impression on Timothy, who from childhood
exhibited a “sensitive and imaginative” disposition34—a personality trait
that would provide him with both his greatest strengths and weaknesses in
adulthood.
In light of these worsening conditions, the Fortunes decided to relinquish
their farm and livestock investments, which they could not sell, and attempt
27. THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 3–4.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7–8.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 9; see also T. Thomas Fortune, After War Times: A Boy’s Life in
Reconstruction Days, Part 9, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Sept. 10, 1927, at 14 (describing early
experiences in newspaper printing).
33. THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 12.
34. Id. at 17.
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a completely new start in the city of Jacksonville. The decision proved the
right one: by 1871, all the Republican leaders in Jackson County had either
been killed or fled as white supremacy took hold through a “number of
outrages . . . greater than in any other part of Florida.”35 Timothy, thirteen
at the time, left home for Tallahassee, where his father’s political
connections got him a position as a state senate page. He made three
dollars a day, which he sent home to his family, and also received tips for
doing errands for the legislators, which he kept for spending money.
Timothy observed and learned much through this experience, and
developed a deep suspicion of carpetbaggers from the North, whom he saw
duping freedmen while claiming to be their friends.36 He also enrolled in
another Freedman’s Bureau school and found various jobs in newspaper
printing and offices. His connections to a Florida congressman got him an
appointment as a mail route agent and then as customs agent, and he
continued earning and saving money for college through these positions.37
On a date that remains somewhat uncertain,38 Fortune enrolled at
Howard University in Washington, D.C., yet another Freedman’s Bureau
institution. There, Fortune obtained all the higher education he would
receive before embarking on his national career as journalist and race
activist, including instruction in law. To understand Fortune’s thought on
the relationship between race activism and law, it helps to trace its roots to
his formative educational experiences at Howard.
B. Howard University
Howard University had opened its doors in 1868 as a school seeking to
impart a classical curriculum with a strong focus on Greek and Latin.39
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 20–21.
37. T. Thomas Fortune, After War Times: A Boy’s Life in Reconstruction Days, Part 20,
NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Sept. 19, 1927, at 16.
38. See CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY FROM
JUNE 1874 TO FEB. 1876 [hereinafter CATALOGUE 1874–1876] (listing Fortune as a student in
the Normal Department); see also THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 24 (dating Fortune’s
enrollment at Howard to 1874). Fortune biographer Shawn Leigh Alexander’s dating of
Fortune’s enrollment to the fall of 1876 seems the best informed. See Alexander, supra note
21, at xiii.
39. See WALTER DYSON, HOWARD UNIVERSITY: THE CAPSTONE OF NEGRO EDUCATION,
A HISTORY: 1867–1940, at 156 (1941). Howard chose this pedagogical goal for two
reasons, according to an internal historian: first, because its founders were graduates of
schools such as Princeton and Yale that used such a classical curriculum; and, second,
because “the opinion generally held at that time [was] that when a Negro learned to read
Greek that accomplishment alone proved his equality with white men.” Id. Oberlin
College’s international fame for educating African Americans in classical languages
weighed heavily in this aspiration. See generally W. E. Bigglestone, Oberlin College and the
Negro Student, 1865–1940, 56 J. NEGRO HIST. 198 (1971) (discussing Oberlin College’s
early model for African American education); James Oliver Horton, Black Education at
Oberlin College: A Controversial Commitment, 54 J. NEGRO EDUC. 477 (1985); Cally L.
Waite, The Segregation of Black Students at Oberlin College After Reconstruction, 41 HIST.
EDUC. Q. 344 (2001).
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Accordingly, in its first years Howard University’s program focused almost
exclusively on such training, even though only a small number of entering
students were prepared for it.40 To accommodate all students, the school
had a Preparatory Department, designed to prepare students to enter college,
as well as a Normal Department, designed to prepare students for
teaching.41 Fortune’s prior education had been spotty, having “been picked
up in printing offices and in much reading of all sorts of literature,” as he
later wrote, so he was required to enroll in both departments, taking some
subjects in each.42 Then, a bank collapse wiped out Fortune’s modest
savings. Determined to obtain a higher education nevertheless, Fortune
found work as a messenger in the U.S. Department of Treasury, and later,
more lucratively, in the print shop of the People’s Advocate, a new African
American weekly newspaper in the city.43
Early in his studies at Howard University, Fortune met the distinguished
African American orator and statesman John Mercer Langston,44 a
Republican lawyer and former Freedman’s Bureau official who had been
appointed as professor of the law department at Howard in 1868, dean in
1870, and acting University president in 1873.45 In July 1875, Langston
40. See DYSON, supra note 39, at 157.
41. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, HOWARD UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1867–
1967, at 34 (1968); see also CATALOGUE 1874–1876, supra note 38, at 7, 18 (describing
curricula and admissions standards for Preparatory and Normal Departments).
42. Fortune, supra note 37, at 92.
43. For an analysis of the importance of the relationships Fortune developed at the
Advocate with many leading African American intellectuals, see Alexander, supra note 21,
at xiii.
44. THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 26.
45. John Mercer Langston had been born in 1829 to a free mother of African American
and Indian heritage and a wealthy white plantation owner father, and had inherited
considerable wealth after both parents passed away in his young childhood. See JOHN
MERCER LANGSTON, FROM THE VIRGINIA PLANTATION TO THE NATIONAL CAPITOL: OR THE
FIRST AND ONLY NEGRO REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE OLD DOMINION 11–16, 22
(Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1894). In 1849, he graduated from Oberlin College, one of
the few universities at the time to offer admission to African Americans. See id. at 96.
Langston’s college education was heavy in the traditional classical curriculum standard
among institutions of higher education at the time, and emphasized ancient languages as well
as rhetoric and elocution, subjects in which Langston excelled. See id. at 93, 112. After
graduation, Langston wanted to go on to law school, but, despite his superior academic
achievement, he was denied admission to several law schools to which he applied on
grounds of race. See id. at 104–10. A college advisor suggested that Langston enroll in
Oberlin’s theology school as a substitute means of obtaining further advanced education in
order to prepare himself to practice law, and Langston did so, obtaining his master’s degree
in theology from Oberlin in 1853.
Langston later reported that he found that his theological training prepared him well
for law. As he explained, “[t]he intricate and profound system of hermeneutics and exegesis
as taught and applied to our sacred writings . . . required all the powers of the stoutest
understanding,” and thus prepared him for the “hardest and most difficult tasks” connected
with difficult intellectual problems, including those in law. Id. at 113.
After obtaining his advanced degree, Langston read for the bar in the offices of a
white abolitionist lawyer, and then sat for and was admitted to the Ohio bar, after the chief
justice committed the subterfuge of examining Langston and concluding that he met the state
bar’s requirement that only “white” men be admitted. Id. at 125.
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resigned after being passed over as permanent university president.46
Fortune, perhaps erroneously, recalls Langston as still presiding over
Howard at the time Fortune was studying there,47 but regardless of whether
he was physically present, Langston’s influence, both on the institution he
had founded and on Fortune personally, persisted according to Fortune’s
account.48
1. Howard Law School
Howard’s law department operated as a part-time night program designed
to be completed in two years.49 The school charged tuition of forty
dollars,50 which most of its small group of students paid by serving as
clerks in federal government offices. Aside from Langston, Howard
University had several adjunct instructors who received small stipends for
teaching part-time at night.51 The school had few resources; its library of
law books was minimal, consisting primarily of donated volumes.52 It
nonetheless produced a number of impressive graduates, including some of
the lawyers and other members of the Niagara Movement, as well as some
of the nation’s first white female lawyers, since it, unlike most law schools
at the time, granted admission to women.53
Enrolled as one of five students in Howard’s law department for the
1877–1878 term,54 Fortune absorbed ideas about law that would lead him to
write in a genre one might label early critical race jurisprudence, which
sounded both in tones of natural rights theory and skeptical realism about
the politically charged nature of courts’ rulings on racial justice. These
ideas were key to Fortune’s later writing, and it therefore bears
Langston practiced law and became active in the abolitionist movement in Ohio, and
during the Civil War helped recruit African American soldiers for the Union army. After the
war, Langston became an official within the Freedman’s Bureau and carried out other civic
work aimed at promoting the Republican Party in African American communities. On
Langston’s life until 1865, see generally WILLIAM CHEEK & AIMEE LEE CHEEK, JOHN
MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FIGHT FOR BLACK FREEDOM, 1829–65 (1989).
46. See LOGAN, supra note 41, at 79–80.
47. See T. Thomas Fortune, After War Times: A Boy’s Life in Reconstruction Days,
Part 22, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Nov. 26, 1927, at 14 (stating that Langston was acting
president when Fortune entered Howard). This recollection does not conform with the
dating of Fortune’s enrollment as the fall of 1876, see supra note 38, but this is not of crucial
significance to my inquiry.
48. See Fortune, supra note 47, at 14.
49. CATALOGUE 1874–1876, supra note 38, at 24.
50. Id. at 26.
51. See DYSON, supra note 39, at 220. In 1875, the university, strapped for funds, could
give the law department even less financial assistance, and its professors thus “served at a
real sacrifice.” Id.
52. Id. at 226–28 (describing the expansion of the law library).
53. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–
1944, at 54 (1993) (describing Howard’s nondiscriminatory admissions policy and the later
accomplishments of some of its early white female graduates).
54. CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY FROM MARCH
1876 TO MARCH, 1878, at 8 (Washington, D.C., W. M. Stuart Printer 1878) [hereinafter
CATALOGUE 1876–1878].
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investigating the jurisprudential tradition Fortune absorbed during his law
school training.
2. John Mercer Langston’s Equal Rights Analysis
Langston’s published speeches55 reveal his abolitionist-style perspective
on the natural rights of all American citizens, regardless of race, to
“absolute legal equality.”56 Consistent with the underlying assumptions of
most jurists at the time, Langston saw rights as falling into several
categories: legal or civil rights, political rights, and social rights.57 Most
important of the political rights was that to “free and untrammeled use of
the ballot.”58 Civil or legal rights concerned that limited set of privileges
considered central to the natural rights of all citizens; it was these rights that
constitutional law should guarantee. In this respect Langston agreed with
the standard legal thought of his era. What is more interesting is
Langston’s views as to which rights fit within this category. In a speech
delivered at the Indianapolis Colored Men’s Convention soon after
Emancipation, Langston listed these legal rights as including
the right to bring a suit in any and all the courts of the country, to be a
witness of competent character therein, to make contracts, under seal or
otherwise, to acquire, hold, and transmit property, to be liable to none
other than the common and usual punishment for offences committed by
him, to have the benefit of trial by a jury of his peers, to acquire and enjoy
without hindrance education and its blessings, . . . and to be subjected by
law to no other restraints and qualifications, with regard to personal
rights, than such as are imposed upon others.59

As reflected in this passage, Langston viewed the right to equal and
nonsegregated education as a core civil right that should be guaranteed
under law. In this view Langston shared the perspective of other

55. Langston’s classroom lecture notes unfortunately do not appear to have survived.
We do, however, know something about Langston’s general method of instruction. It
emphasized, as Langston later reported, the forensics he had found so useful in his own
education; students performed “dissertations, addresses and debates,” and “‘extemporaneous
oration’ on law topics, held weekly under the direction of the dean.” LANGSTON, supra note
45, at 298. In addition, Langston held mandatory lectures every Saturday morning on the
topic of “professional ethics,” which involved “full exposition of those branches of
intellectual and moral philosophy so essential to . . . a thorough understanding of the law.”
Id. at 300–01. These, he was sure, were “in no sense an irksome duty for a single [student].”
Id. at 301.
56. John Mercer Langston, Citizenship and the Ballot, Address Before the Colored
Men’s Convention of Indiana (Oct. 25, 1865), in FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP: SELECTED
LECTURES AND ADDRESSES 99, 99 (Washington, D.C., Rufus H. Darby 1883) [hereinafter
LECTURES].
57. See generally LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN 81–87 (1999) (discussing this late-nineteenth-century taxonomy of
rights).
58. Langston, supra note 56, at 100.
59. Id. at 99–100.
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abolitionists, such as Charles Sumner.60 But the abolitionists differed in
this position from most jurists of the late nineteenth century, who classified
education as a “social” right. Social rights, the standard legal thinking held,
pertained to free and voluntary associations among persons in the private
sphere, and neither could nor should be subject to government regulation
through law.
This jurisprudential carving of the realm of rights into civil or legal
rights, requiring recognition and protection in law, and social rights, which
were not properly subject to law’s reach, posed a major problem to postReconstruction civil rights jurisprudence, as historian Linda Przybyszewski
has discussed in her biography of Supreme Court Justice John Marshall
Harlan.61 Justice Harlan was the sole dissenter in several key opinions in
which the Court retreated from the Reconstruction Era agenda. But Justice
Harlan failed to dissent from some other key cases of this type. According
to Przybyszewski, in these cases a major stumbling block in Harlan’s
thinking was his inability to categorize the rights at issue—namely, the
right to attend nonsegregated public schools, and the right to engage in
intimate relationships across race lines—as civil as opposed to social
rights.62
In contrast, T. Thomas Fortune faced no such analytic conundrum
because he fully embraced the abolitionist view of the rights to equal
education and to engage in intimate relationships and marriage with the
person of one’s choosing as core legal or civil rights. In his staunch
insistence on the nonsegregation principle in education, even after many of
his contemporaries began to back away from such absolutism, Fortune had
learned well from Langston’s example. In a 1874 speech, Langston had
called for the abolition of “[t]wo separate school systems, tolerating
discriminations in favor of one class against another.”63 And in a speech at
Howard University that same year, Langston placed this demand in the
mouth of abolitionist Charles Sumner, who, Langston reported, had charged
the first class of graduates from Howard’s law department with the
following professional mission:
I do not doubt that every denial of equal rights, whether in the schoolroom, the jury-box, the public hotel, the steamboat, or the public
conveyance, by land or water, is contrary to the fundamental principles of
republican government, and therefore to the Constitution itself, which
should be corrected by the courts, if not by Congress. See to it that this is
60. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 57, at 82–83 (“As a congressman during
Reconstruction, Sumner tried to shift public schools and accommodations from the category
of social rights to that of civil rights.”).
61. Id. at 81–117.
62. Id. at 84–87 (examining why Harlan dissented in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), but failed to dissent in Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), and Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175
U.S. 528 (1899)).
63. John Mercer Langston, Equality Before the Law, Address at Oberlin College (May
14, 1874), in LECTURES, supra note 56, at 154.
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done. The Constitution does not contain the word ‘white;’ who can insert
it in the law? Insist th[en] the common school, where the child is
prepared for the duties of manhood, shall know no discrimination
unknown to the Constitution.64

As this passage well illustrates, Langston was passionately committed to the
principle of nonsegregation, not only in education but in transportation and
public accommodations as well. As he stated in continuing this same
speech cast through Sumner’s reported words,
Insist, also, that the public conveyances and public hotels, owing their
existence to law, shall know no discrimination unknown to the
Constitution . . . . Insist upon equal rights everywhere; make others insist
upon them. . . . I hold you to this allegiance: first, by the race from which
you are sprung; and secondly, by the profession which you now
espouse.65

In short, Langston espoused a noncompromising abolitionist equal rights
rhetoric on such matters as education, public transportation, and public
accommodations, and saw work toward securing equal legal rights as key to
the mission of African American lawyers, both as a matter of race
allegiance and professional role. Fortune adhered to the same viewpoint
throughout his writing in the decade of the 1880s.
But this focus on the achievement of legal recognition of the principle of
nonsegregation in education, transportation, and public accommodations
was not the only or main political objective of late-nineteenth-century race
activists. Instead, as I discuss below in Part II, Fortune, along with his
contemporaries, soon began to complicate this analysis with other emphases
that included racial solidarity and self-help—and, for some militants such as
Fortune, economic radicalism as well.
In the end, Fortune did not graduate from the law department; marriage
and pressing financial commitments caused him to leave without his
degree.66 But Fortune’s studies at Howard left him with a life-long interest
and sophistication in analyzing law. As his biographer points out, through
his law study, “Fortune gained an understanding of fundamentals,
especially in American constitutional law, which was reflected in his
writings in later years.”67

64. John Mercer Langston, Eulogy on Charles Sumner, Address at Howard University
(Apr. 24, 1874), in LECTURES, supra note 56, at 178.
65. Id. at 178–79.
66. In part, Fortune’s education fell victim to national political developments: in 1876,
the Republicans lost control of Congress, and with this change came a drying up of funding,
both in student aid through jobs arranged by friendly Republican congressmen, and in
institutional resources for Howard University and its law department in particular, which
closed for the 1876–1877 academic year. See CATALOGUE 1876–1878, supra note 54, at 8
(stating that the law school did not operate in 1876–1877); THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at
24–28 (describing Fortune’s situation in Washington, D.C.).
67. THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 27.
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Fortune and his new wife, Carrie (nee Smiley), decided to return to
Florida for “four dark and troublous years.”68 There Fortune tried teaching
in the school system but “found conditions insufferable,” including
miserable pay, political exploitation, and indignities in the treatment by the
superintendents and trustees69—another formative experience that
undoubtedly contributed to Fortune’s strong interest in education reform.
He returned to his printing skills at a Jacksonville newspaper, but “found
the atmosphere of Florida so degrading and stifling”70 that he could not
tolerate it. Luck turned Fortune’s way when a former co-worker from the
Washington, D.C., Advocate told him about a job opening as a printer for a
white-owned religious newspaper in New York City. Job offer in hand,
Fortune left Florida with Carrie in 1881.
C. Fortune’s Journalism Career to 1890
1. Fortune’s Newspapers
As his biographer recounts, Fortune’s first experiences in New York City
were less than fully positive. Although conditions with respect to the
exercise of civil and political rights were better in New York City than in
Florida—African Americans could vote and often attended integrated
public schools—Fortune found “that in some respects economic
proscription was more intense than in Florida.”71 Soon after he started
working at the newspaper that had recruited him, for example, the white
employees of the paper walked out on strike, protesting the fact that their
employer had added a second African American employee to the staff.72
The strikers were unsuccessful in their demand and Fortune and his friend
continued to work at the paper for a year, but must have felt highly
uncomfortable there. They soon began helping at a new small AfricanAmerican weekly paper and, once they judged it financially feasible to do
so, they decamped for full-time work on that paper. Fortune became its
managing editor in 188373 and renamed it the New York Globe, thus
launching himself at the age of twenty-five into a career as a national public
intellectual.74

68. T. Thomas Fortune, After War Times, Part 23, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Dec. 3, 1927, at
16.
69. THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 32.
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id.
73. Fortune first worked as managing editor of the New York Globe with a general editor
named John F. Quarles, a man of scholarly accomplishment and wide travel who had studied
law at Howard under Langston and now practiced law in New York City. Id. at 41. After
lending a hand in Fortune’s training, Quarles turned over the full editorship to Fortune. Id.
74. The Globe’s launching roughly coincided with the founding of many African
American and other special interest newspapers in many parts of the country. See id. at 39–
40 & n.6. The four-page weekly was produced on-site using relatively inexpensive printing
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The name of Fortune’s paper changed periodically as different business
partnerships formed and dissolved, so that it sequentially bore the names
New York Globe (until November 1884), New York Freeman (until October
1887), and then New York Age (until Fortune’s breakdown in 1907 and
Booker T. Washington’s secret assumption of financial control). But
except for a year and a half during which Fortune’s brother and another
partner assumed editorial responsibility, the character and purpose of
Fortune’s paper remained constant: to present politically independent,
sharp, and often witty analyses of the events of his time. His work offered
fresh and creative perspectives that still sound surprisingly on point in their
critical insights.75
I will explore in more detail Fortune’s favorite topics in Part II below.
By way of general introduction, these topics included federal aid for
education, maltreatment of African Americans on common carriers and in
places of public accommodations and amusement, and, with increasing
frequency as the decade of the 1880s wore on, reports of “outrages” in the
form of lynchings and other acts of violence against African Americans
(and also other groups, such as Italian Americans, about which Fortune also
reported).76 Fortune published many exposés of the peonage labor and the
convict leasing systems in the South, and he wrote in support of the
nondiscriminatory policies of the Knights of Labor, the then-growing labor
organization that sought to unite workers across race lines in both the North
and the South.77 Editorials on the need for African American and white
workers to recognize their common class interests were frequent.
Fortune was a staunch women’s rights advocate, and his papers usually
carried a weekly women’s column, written by a leading African American
society woman, as well as occasional reporting on women’s suffrage and
the accomplishments of African American women in the professions.78
technology at which Fortune was expert, and bore a mistake-free, professional appearance
unusual at the time. Id. at 44.
75. His format remained constant as well. Hard news and political analysis typically
appeared on the front page, along with columns submitted by regional correspondents from
around the country reporting on local developments and happenings. Internal editorial pages
carried opinion pieces, frequently but not always drafted by Fortune, along with snippets of
information and opinion, and often letters responding to pieces run in prior weeks. These
letters were often quite critical, thus giving Fortune’s papers, at least through the early
1890s, the feel of an open forum for disagreement and debate. See infra note 208 (citing
examples of letters critical of Fortune’s ideas).
76. See, e.g., Eleven Men Murdered—Is the White South Civilized?, N.Y. AGE, Mar. 21,
1891 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on the murder by “a mob of ‘the
best citizens’ of New Orleans” of eleven Italians being held in custody following a jury
acquittal and noting similar issues of prejudice as those facing black men in the South).
77. On the Knights of Labor, see generally PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE
BLACK WORKER, 1619–1973, at 47–63 (1974).
78. See, e.g., T. Thomas Fortune, Afro-American Women, N.Y. AGE, Apr. 25, 1891 (on
file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing African American women’s
accomplishments as physicians and other professionals and concluding that “women are
taking care of themselves”); Mr. Fortune of the West: Glances at Indianapolis and Chicago,
N.Y. AGE, Aug. 11, 1888 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing meeting Ida
Wells, “who handles a goose quill with diamond point as handily as any of us men in
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Fortune also displayed a sympathetic sensitivity to the political struggles of
other traditionally excluded groups, including people of color around the
world,79 and (after a brief foray into populist anti-Semitism80) Jews, whom
he saw as experiencing discrimination in the United States and Russia
similar to that facing African Americans.81 His favorite analogy, however,
was to the political struggles of the Irish, whose experiences provided
particular inspiration for his vision for the Afro-American League, as I will
discuss later.82
In 1884, Fortune wrote Black and White, a book that outlined the
underlying political and economic philosophy that guided his journalistic
writings throughout the 1880s. A brief examination of that work completes
my background discussion here.
2. Fortune’s Creative Accomplishment in Black and White
Although some Fortune scholars have downplayed the significance of
Black and White,83 a recent reassessment persuasively argues that such
views are tainted by American historians’ cold war antipathy to recognizing
the importance of economic radicalism in the civil rights movement.84 In
any case, when read through contemporary eyes, Black and White does
seem to present a curious mix of natural rights talk melded with the rhetoric
newspaper work”); The Nation Capital, N.Y. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1884 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (reporting that “Belva A. Lockwood, one of the most distinguished
lawyers at the capital,” had accepted the Woman’s Rights nomination for President);
Women’s Suffrage Convention, N.Y. FREEMAN, Nov. 7, 1885 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (women’s suffrage convention in Boston). Fortune gave militant journalist,
organizer, and antilynching activist Ida B. Wells a job and ownership interest in his paper
after a mob destroyed her printing operation in Tennessee in the aftermath of her paper’s
criticism of a lynching in 1892. His support of women and women’s rights distinguished
him from some race activists of his time. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. FOX, THE GUARDIAN OF
BOSTON: WILLIAM MONROE TROTTER 102–03 (1970) (describing militant African American
journalist William Monroe Trotter’s opposition to women being granted membership rights
in the Niagara Movement); see also PAULA J. GIDDINGS, IDA: A SWORD AMONG LIONS: IDA
B. WELLS AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 151, 231–32 (2008) (describing Fortune’s
support for Wells’s career).
79. See Seth Moglen, Introduction to FORTUNE, supra note 24, at v, ix (describing
Fortune as “unusually attentive to the way in which the oppression of African Americans
was part of a global system of economic exploitation that affected poor people of all races
and nationalities”).
80. See The Labor Problem, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. AGE, Jan. 11, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(expressing sympathy for Jews).
82. See, e.g., Mr. Downing on Ireland: What Irishmen Have Done for Freedom, N.Y.
FREEMAN, Jan. 9, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (discussed further infra notes
125, 194 and accompanying text).
83. See, e.g., THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 70, 82 (describing the book as giving
“the impression of having been written in haste by an angry but reasonable young man,” and
Fortune’s economic ideas as “not profound”); McPherson, supra note 19 (“When he wrote as
a quasi-Marxist, Fortune was less perceptive and original than when he wrote as a
Negro . . . . [H]is economic ideas were derivative and sometimes superficial . . . .”).
84. Moglen, supra note 79, at v, xiii–xv.
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of economic radicalism. But might not the very fact that Fortune’s theory
appears somewhat curious today signal the historic loss of ideas that tie
concepts of civil and political rights to arguments for more just economic
arrangements?85 If so, those ideas may merit excavation as part of the
project of developing new syntheses along these lines today.
Fortune’s theory of natural rights starts with the idea that human beings
have certain inherent rights, including not only the political and civil rights
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence—which he, like Langston,
was fond of citing86—but also rights to basic subsistence resources
including air and water.87 This was a version of agrarian radicalism
espoused by thinkers such as the English protosocialist John Ruskin88 and
the American single-taxer Henry George,89 both of whom developed ideas
that remained important in American progressivism during the years of
transition from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial
economy.90 Drawing from ideas about the importance of rights in land
from George and Irish activist Charles Stewart Parnell, Fortune included the
right to land as one of these natural rights.91 To Fortune, an important start
to solving the problems of poverty, oppression, inequality, and vice lay in
the grant to all citizens of the right to supply their basic subsistence needs
through land’s cultivation.92 Fortune extended this basic analysis to the
problem of class oppression shared among both African American and
white workers. Fortune argued that the fundamental cause of social
injustice was the amalgamation of great wealth in the hands of the few,
along with the exploitation of working people’s labor to generate that
wealth.
It was not a far stretch from these political convictions to an interest in
the labor movement as a potentially positive political force for social and
85. But see generally JACKSON, supra note 11 (exploring Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
efforts to develop and reclaim ideas linking the civil rights movement to the movement for
economic justice).
86. See, e.g., FORTUNE, supra note 24, at 72.
87. Id. at 136.
88. John Ruskin was an English art and social critic who wrote in opposition to the free
market liberal individualism of philosophers such as John Stuart Mill. See generally JOHN
RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985). Ruskin’s ideas
included extending the principles of Biblical teachings about caring for the poor into
economic relationships by adopting laws to impose just wages, prevent the exploitation of
workers, and protect the destitute; in the words of one expert commentator, much of what
Ruskin argued for “are now the truisms of the welfare state.” Clive Wilmer, Introduction to
RUSKIN, supra, at 7, 30.
89. Henry George, author of Progress and Poverty, was an enormously popular writer at
the time who argued that the roots of economic injustice and other social problems of the
nineteenth century lay in the private ownership of land and proposed a single land tax as a
way of equalizing social wealth. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY
(Vanguard Press 1929) (1879).
90. Moglen, supra note 79, at xxi.
91. FORTUNE, supra note 24, at 136–37. I am grateful to Shawn Leigh Alexander for
pointing out to me the relationship between this idea and the thought of Irish activist Charles
Parnell.
92. Id.
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economic change. Fortune wrote optimistically of his hope that in the
South and elsewhere workers would soon unite across race lines to develop
a political force aimed at redistributing society’s wealth. Foreseeing a time
when racism would be less prevalent than it was in his, Fortune noted that
even then class oppression would undoubtedly persist. Even a world in
which race discrimination had abated, Fortune argued, would not present
true conditions for justice. Fortune’s powers of sympathetic identification
led him to a political vision based on reducing both racial and general
economic injustice. To Fortune, poverty was the true touchstone of
injustice, regardless of race. As he stated in his preface to Black and White:
“My purpose is to show that poverty and misfortune make no invidious
distinctions of ‘race, color, or previous condition,’ but that wealth unduly
centralized oppresses all alike.”93
Fortune developed other themes in Black and White that would be of
great importance to the thought of the period. He wrote cogently of the
need for African Americans to maintain political independence from both
major electoral parties,94 and he weighed in on the debate about classical
versus “industrial” models of higher education.95 But it would take us too
93. FORTUNE, supra note 24, at xxxii.
94. Fortune called on African Americans to break away from the Republican Party,
which had betrayed African Americans both during and after Reconstruction. Id. at 69–79.
He also saw that the Democratic Party was no friend to African Americans; what was needed
was political independence so that African Americans could make politicians work for their
votes. Id. This was a theme to which Fortune would return repeatedly in the pages of his
paper and one that shaped his organizational plan for the Afro-American League (AAL). See
infra Part III.
95. The debate about the respective virtues of classical higher education, emphasizing
languages and rhetoric as already described, versus what was often referred to as “industrial”
education, centered on more practical, often manual or vocational, skills, lasted among
African American intellectual leaders for years, and is one of the points of disagreement
often cited in summarizing the iconic clash between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du
Bois. It is possible that scholars have made too much of this disagreement, since in actuality
all significant race organizations took care to formally endorse both education routes. But
the debate is interesting nonetheless in raising issues concerning the relationship between
economic class and strategies for racial progress.
Fortune brought a personal vehemence to the topic, though it is hard to see why any
personal bitterness about his own educational experiences underlay his views. It was, after
all, his exposure to a classical education emphasizing rhetoric, elocution, and classical
languages at Howard that helped prepare him for his own subsequent career as a leading
national intellectual (although, it must be conceded, his manual typesetting skills were also
essential). Fortune may have been writing less out of personal experience than out of
sympathetic identification with many of his cohorts’ frustration at finding themselves
continually thwarted by discrimination from success in professional careers. As Fortune
argued,
I maintain that any education is false which is unsuited to the condition and the
prospects of the student. To educate him for a lawyer when there are no clients,
for medicine when the patients, although numerous, are too poor to give him a
living income, to fill his head with Latin and Greek as a teacher when the people
he is to teach are to be instructed in the a b c’s—such education is a waste . . . .
FORTUNE, supra note 24, at 47. Opponents of industrial education often fastened on the idea
that advocating vocational training was equivalent to admitting African American inferiority
and entitlement to a less advanced form of education than that which white students could
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far afield to engage in a detailed examination of these themes; my focus
must remain on Fortune’s ideas about race activism, government, and law.
On these topics, Fortune’s writing reveals a deeply cynical but also
passionately justice-seeking sensibility that helps illuminate the analytic
underpinnings of late-nineteenth-century militant visions of racial justice
and strategies for its achievement. I turn to that topic in Part II below.
II. FORTUNE ON THE ROLE OF LAW IN ACHIEVING RACIAL JUSTICE
A close reading of Fortune’s journalism, along with his work in Black
and White, reveals his analysis of the problem of racial injustice as a deep
and multifaceted one, whose solution would require change in many
spheres of life, especially education and economics. Law-trained and with
a talent for generating prescient legal-critical insights, Fortune clearly
regarded law as important to the struggle for racial justice. Proactively,
Fortune argued for legislative change, especially federal legislation to fund
and guarantee the right to effective and adequate education for all citizens.
But Fortune also strongly championed court-focused strategies aimed at the
retroactive undoing of the Supreme Court’s holdings limiting the reach of
the Reconstruction Amendments and the civil rights statutes enacted under
them.
Although Fortune and others writing in his weekly cared deeply about
law in this respect, they never came close to embracing legal liberalist
notions that court-driven legal principles could solve the problem of racial
injustice. Indeed, it would be ludicrous to think that these historical figures,
given what they had witnessed and experienced in their lifetimes, would be
anywhere near so naive as to trust courts in this way. Fortune’s view of the
Court is well summed up by his pithy descriptions of that institution as
“deficient in legal acumen,” “swayed by colorphobia,” and “biased by
powerful corporate influences.”96 Needless to say, believing that courtmade law matters deeply to the cause of racial justice is not the same as
being a legal liberal.
A. Fortune on Education
Foremost among the topics that received front-page attention in Fortune’s
papers throughout the 1880s was a decade-long, eventually unsuccessful
initiative to obtain federal aid for education, commonly referred to as the
Blair Education Bill, in reference to its chief sponsor, Republican Senator
routinely expect. But that was far from the militant Fortune’s point. To Fortune, there was
nothing degrading about being a member of the laboring class; rather, it was there that
human dignity rested. Those who deserved to be looked at askance, as members of a
“peculiar” class that “stand off by themselves,” id. at 38, were those few African Americans
who had higher educations and elitist aspirations. Fortune’s profession (though certainly not
his income) placed him in this elite class of intellectuals, but his allegiance still rested with
the struggling laborer and recently emancipated freedmen of his own background.
96. Mr. Justice Harlan’s Opinion of Civil Rights, N.Y. GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1883 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
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Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire. This initiative took the form of several
proposals to provide approximately fifteen million dollars in federal aid per
year to states in proportion to their respective illiteracy rates in order to help
support improvements in basic education.97 The proposals gained favorable
Senate action several times, only to be blocked from action in the House of
Representatives.98
According to historians, opposition to the bill did not line up on regional
or party grounds. Southern states wanted the appropriation, arguing that
since Northerners had forced enfranchisement of African Americans, they
should help bear the costs of educating the freedmen. The key issues that
blocked enactment involved opponents’ wariness about Republican
protariff policies and concerns about locking treasury surpluses into
expensive new appropriations commitments.99 Other stated concerns
invoked federalism, or constitutional limits on federal involvement in and
oversight of state matters. To counter these objections, later versions of the
proposed bill called for joint federal and state oversight, or even left
supervision of expenditures completely to the states.100 Yet another
objection was whether federal funding would eventually come with
demands for nonsegregated education. In an attempt to allay these fears,
the proposed bill was amended to explicitly authorize continuation of dual
education systems, though even this step failed to result in its enactment.101
Such compromise proposals may have been acceptable to the
politicians—and even to African American leaders who were consulted on
the matter—because many were willing at the time to compromise on the
nonsegregation principle in the interests of obtaining more resources for
African American education.102 Not surprisingly, however, segregated
education was unacceptable to equal rights militants such as Fortune.103 He
was likewise opposed to proposals to reduce or eliminate proposed federal
oversight of appropriations to the states, pointing out that southern states
already invested far more funds in white schools than in African American
97. See generally Daniel W. Crofts, The Black Response to the Blair Education Bill, 37
J. S. HIST. 41 (1971); Allen J. Going, The South and the Blair Education Bill, 44 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 267 (1957). Four versions of the Blair Education Bill were introduced
between 1880 and 1890, after which time the proposal died for all realistic purposes. See id.
at 288, 290.
98. Going, supra note 97, at 275.
99. Id. at 273–90.
100. Id.
101. Crofts, supra note 97, at 43; Going, supra note 97, at 273–74.
102. Crofts, supra note 97, at 53 (reporting surprise of one egalitarian white congressman
to discover that African American Baptist ministers with whom he met in Washington, D.C.,
supported segregated education). The issue of segregated education was a top topic of
debate in the many African American literary societies that flourished in the late nineteenth
century in major cities including New York, Washington, D.C., and Boston, with papers
being delivered on both sides of the question. See, e.g., Mixed or Separate Schools: Lack of
Business Enterprise by Race Journals, N.Y. FREEMAN, May 29, 1886 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (arguing against speaker at Bethel Literary Society in Washington,
D.C., who advocated separate schools).
103. See, e.g., FORTUNE, supra note 24, at 70–71.
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ones and could be expected to continue to do the same with additional funds
received from the federal government in the absence of federal oversight.104
Throughout the 1880s, Fortune wrote in favor of the Blair initiative but
against compromise proposals that would have assured the continued
acceptability of segregated schools.
In 1883, Fortune testified before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Education.105 In his testimony, republished in his paper, Fortune argued
that the national government should be the guarantor of the social resources
necessary to prepare its citizens for effective citizenship: “the education of
the people is a legitimate function of Government and is not in any sense a
feature of centralization, but is eminently a feature of self preservation.”106
Education should be equated with national defense and other services
provided by the national government without controversy: “We make
lavish appropriations for harbors, forts, the navy and the army for the
common defense, but illiteracy is a more insidious foe from within than any
that can or will assail us from without.”107 Fortune further proposed the
creation of a federal Bureau of Education to assume responsibility for
education.108
To the Fortune writing in the early and mid 1880s, the federal
government was the proper protector of the fundamental well-being and
proper development of its citizens.
This responsibility included
guaranteeing a right to adequate and effective education, not only for
African Americans but also for “ignorant foreigners” and uneducated
whites as well.109 Fortune saw a connection of fundamental importance
between education and racial justice, and saw this connection as including
not only a negative right to be free of state-sponsored discrimination in the
form of school segregation, but also the positive right to an adequate and
effective education that would properly prepare citizens for citizenship and
provide them with the future means of earning a livelihood and achieving
economic security.110
104. Id.
105. Status of the Race: Mr. Fortune Before the United States Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, N.Y. GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. When New York newspapers published editorials raising constitutional objections to
the Blair initiatives, Fortune fired back that “in this matter of National aid to education . . .
[i]lliteracy is a national sore” that could not “be left to heal itself,” and that intelligent
citizenry is not only a state but also a national blessing. Id. On the issue of cost, Fortune
pointed out, the money that would go to help fund Southern schools was “little in excess of
the annual appropriation for education by the Single state of New York.” National Aid to
Education, N.Y. GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1884 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
109. The Blair Education Bill, N.Y. FREEMAN, Jan. 1, 1887 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
110. Fortune made the same points and elaborated on them further in Black and White.
Pointing to statistics showing that, upon Emancipation, fewer than one in ten thousand
freedmen could read or write, Fortune argued that the federal government had the
responsibility to rectify this situation as part of developing a free and capable citizenry.
FORTUNE, supra note 24, at 28–31. Articulating a far more robust understanding of state
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In his congressional testimony, Fortune tied his analysis of the federal
government’s duty to guarantee education to his critique of peonage and
convict labor in the South and the need to provide means for southern
African Americans to improve their economic situation.111 He worked in
some of his ideas about basic rights to subsistence guaranteed by
government through access to commonly owned land as well. Not one to
mince words in front of any audience, he included rhetoric on the evils of
concentrating wealth in the hands of the few.112 This was another topic to
which he returned repeatedly in his writing, and his view on the
government’s role in regulating economic relations further reveals his
understanding of the relationships between racial and economic justice and
law. I turn to that subject below.
B. The Labor Movement and Private, Voluntary Economic Ordering
If Fortune’s top priority was the right to education guaranteed by the
national government, perhaps his second-favorite topic concerned the
relationship of race oppression to economic systems of production. Fortune
was especially interested in how the operation of law maintained oppressive
systems of economic production, especially in peonage and convict
labor,113 but also in the exploitation of labor generally. Thus Fortune

action and the role of the government in fostering the conditions for human flourishing than
that which the Court was then able (or has yet) to grasp, Fortune wrote that “[t]he United
States government is directly responsible for the illiteracy and the widespread poverty which
obtain in the South” because it was “[u]nder its sanction and by its connivance [that] the
institution of slavery flourished and prospered, until it had taken such deep root as to be
almost impossible of extirpation.” Id. at 32. Fortune unabashedly proposed a unified
national system of education as the proper means by which to meet this responsibility. In his
book, as in his newspapers, he also vehemently opposed segregated schools on grounds of
both their status-based harm and the wasteful costliness of maintaining dual systems. Id. at
39 (“Aside from the manifest injustice of setting up two school-houses in the same ward or
district—injustice to the children in the spirit, false from every standpoint, that one child is
better than another—the double expense of maintaining two schools is obvious . . . .”).
111. Status of the Race: Mr. Fortune Before the United States Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, supra note 105.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Infamies of the Southern Convict Lease System, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1884
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (“[W]e unhesitatingly pronounce the penal systems
of the twelve Southern States which practice the ‘Convict Lease System’ as an open
violation of the 13th article of the Federal Constitution.”); N.Y. FREEMAN, Sept. 18, 1886
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (analyzing states’ enactment of laws to keep
“industrial slave’s noses to the grinds-tone”); N.Y. FREEMAN, Dec. 3, 1886 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (discussing the “southern labor question”); Rambles in the South:
Industrial Slavery in South Carolina, N.Y. FREEMAN, May 16, 1885 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (condemning the system of “industrial slavery” in South Carolina);
The Rich and the Poor, N.Y. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1883 (describing as “among the most difficult
problems” this issue of how millions of industrious African American laborers in the South
“are to be protected against deliberate robbery, and robbery viler still because clothed in the
garb of legislative enactment”); Victorious Strikers, N.Y. FREEMAN, Feb. 19, 1887 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on strike of guano workers in Alabama). The
young Booker T. Washington also contributed analyses condemning the southern prison
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wrote, the “poorer classes of the South are systematically victimized
through the medium of legislation” and these “laws are systematically
framed in the interest of capitalist.”114
Fortune also reported with great enthusiasm about the growth of the
Knights of Labor and about that organization’s explicitly nonracist message
and membership policies.115 Fortune saw in the Knights of Labor hopeful
signs of the potential development of a unified, majoritarian, class-based
political movement. Unlike electoral party politics, about which he was
unremittingly cynical, Fortune continued through the end of the 1880s to
retain a positive hope for the white working class’s potential for racial
enlightenment.116
system. See, e.g., Booker T. Washington, Southern Prisons, N.Y. FREEMAN, Apr. 17, 1886
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (noting the suffering in southern prisons).
114. The Rich and the Poor, supra note 113.
115. See, e.g., Boston’s Labor Movement: The True Lesson of Judge Ruffin’s Funeral,
N.Y. FREEMAN, Dec. 11, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on Knights
of Labor meeting in Boston); Colored Knights of Labor in Arkansas, N.Y. FREEMAN, July
17, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on Knights of Labor strike in
Arkansas and tying it to analysis of peonage labor as “virtual continuation of the slave
system”); Failure of Labor, N.Y. FREEMAN, Apr. 10, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (reporting on unsuccessful Knights of Labor action); Labor Upheavals, N.Y.
FREEMAN, Mar. 20, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on rise of
Knights of Labor and that “colored men all over the Union are rapidly becoming affiliated
with the organization,” a fact “[w]e predicted . . . in ‘Black and White,’ but we did not
expect so speedy a consummation of [our] prediction”); N.Y. FREEMAN, Oct. 9, 1886 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (stating that Knights of Labor “took Southern prejudice,
arrogance and intolerance by the throat and gave it the most furious shaking it has had since
the war,” and refused “to sanction the discrimination made against their colored fellowmember”).
116. See, e.g., The Economic and Civil Conditions North and South, N.Y. FREEMAN, Feb.
12, 1887 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (stating the time will come “when the
white and black masses of the South will recognize that they have mutual interests”). By the
end of the decade, labor confrontations had grown increasingly violent, and rising Jim
Crowism had clearly infected the white-led labor movement just as it had the rest of the
country. Fortune began to publish critical reports about manifestations of race prejudice
within the labor movement, but continued to express hope that the labor movement would
take a turn in a positive direction. See, e.g., M. W. Caldwell, Civil Rights in Tennessee:
Manifestations of Prejudice in Nashville, N.Y. AGE, July 5, 1890 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (reporting on ludicrous discrimination of railroad unions).
In this position, Fortune was very much an independent thinker, as shown by
comparing his view to that of his close friend and fellow activist T. McCants Stewart.
Stewart was an African American minister, professor, and lawyer who often wrote for and
was featured in Fortune’s weeklies. Stewart shared Fortune’s progressive analysis of the
evils of unrestrained capitalism and the need to reduce the disparity between the rich and the
poor, but Stewart’s thinking focused on within-race advancement and eschewed what he saw
as Fortune’s romantic notions of majoritarian class solidarity across lines of race. Stewart
even agreed with the position taken in an article in another African American paper to the
effect that “black men [should] combine and apply for the places made vacant by the
strikers, . . . . [I]f we fail to apply and then growl about not having an opportunity to compete
with the whites, the fault will be with us.” Pernicious Labor Teachings, N.Y. FREEMAN, May
1, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review). In response, Fortune countered that he
thought it a shame to see “so good a man as [Stewart] go wrong.” Some Crude Notions of
Capital and Labor, N.Y. FREEMAN, May 22, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
Fortune argued that “colored laborers . . . cannot afford to antagonize white laborers when
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Although Fortune championed a strong labor movement, he was not a
booster of all of its activities. Fortune wanted the labor movement to amass
political power in order to change the fundamental structure of government,
as the Knights of Labor had envisioned; he did not espouse a labor
movement model aimed at settling industrial relations through contests of
private power, as the trade union model endorsed.117 An unsigned editorial
written a few days after the Haymarket Riot of May 4, 1886, explained
these views.118 The editorial, entitled “The Futility of Strikes and
Boycots,” disapproved of the growing phenomenon of labor strikes aimed
at securing higher wages and the eight-hour work day.119 At first glance,
this might appear a strange position for an editorial in Fortune’s paper,
given Fortune’s usual staunchly prounion views.120 But in context, the
the latter are on strike for whatever cause,” and that Stewart’s doctrine encouraging African
American strikebreaking was a “pernicious practice” that “would intensify the antagonism
between white and colored labor.” Id. For biographical information on Stewart, see ALBERT
S. BROUSSARD, AFRICAN-AMERICAN ODYSSEY: THE STEWARTS, 1853–1963 (1998).
117. On the difference between the Knights of Labor and trade unionism, see FONER,
supra note 77, at 56 (“The reform program of the Knights stressed land reform, increased
education, and workers’ cooperatives, matters of minor interest to the national trade unions,
which concentrated on higher wages, shorter hours, and improved working conditions.”).
118. The Haymarket Riot involved a massive strike in Chicago in support of the eighthour day that ended in multiple deaths of civilians and police after unknown persons—
probably anarchists—threw a bomb into the crowd. It marked the culmination of a growing
wave of strikes called primarily by the craft union movement to force employers to grant an
eight-hour day and other labor concessions. See JAMES GREEN, DEATH IN THE HAYMARKET:
A STORY OF CHICAGO, THE FIRST LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE BOMBING THAT DIVIDED
GILDED AGE AMERICA 145–91 (2006).
119. The Futility of Strikes and Boycots, N.Y. FREEMAN, May 8, 1886 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
120. In his interest in and support for the labor movement, Fortune was joined in and
influenced by another friend and fellow newspaper editor John Swinton. See THORNBROUGH,
supra note 22, at 42 (noting that Fortune described Swinton as the first white journalist “who
extended to me the right hand of fellowship”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Swinton
was a white militant journalist who owned his own well-respected but largely self-funded
radical paper, John Swinton’s Paper, from 1883 until 1887; the two men’s friendship was
based on the many interests they had in common. Both were gifted journalists with a
passion for both racial and economic justice and strong intellectual interests in the
progressive and radical political and economic theorists of their day. See id. at 44.
For biographical treatments of Swinton, see EUGENE V. DEBS, PASTELS OF MEN
(1919); ROBERT WATERS, CAREER AND CONVERSATION OF JOHN SWINTON: JOURNALIST,
ORATOR, ECONOMIST 9 (1902). See also SENDER GARLIN, THREE AMERICAN RADICALS 3–46
(1991); John Swinton Dead: The Noted Economist, Writer, and Orator Gone, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1901, at 9. Swinton was a Scot by birth who had emigrated to Kansas during the
free-soil movement in the 1850s and later moved to New York City. Much of Swinton’s
writing covered the labor movement and the cause of working people generally, but Swinton
also included analyses on race-progressive lines, such as sympathetic explanations of the
causes of African American strikebreaking. GARLIN, supra, at 27–28 (citing Editorial, A
Mistake of Colored Men, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER, Nov. 28, 1886). Swinton wrote editorials
denouncing the system of convict labor in the South, very possibly motivated by Fortune’s
many excellent treatments of this subject in his papers. The two men clearly read and
sometimes cited each other. See, e.g., Educational Problem, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1883 (on
file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on speech Swinton gave before the Bethel
Literary and Historical Association); The Civil Rights Decision, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1883
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (announcing first appearance of Swinton’s paper);
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views expressed in the editorial are consistent with Fortune’s view about
the role of government in protecting its citizens and setting the conditions
for a just society.
The editorial in Fortune’s paper argued that it was counterproductive to
the true aims of the working class to seek shorter hours and higher wages
through industrial confrontation rather than government reform. This was
because the laws of economics dictated that higher wages and shorter hours
would cause employers’ manufacturing costs to go up, which employers
would pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices; through this cycle,
working people would find themselves no better off because their wages
would buy less. Thus, private ordering of economic relations through a
battle between labor and capital would not accomplish the goal of greater
economic justice; only government could do that:
[P]hilosophers of the labor movement will still have to seek the proper
remedy through the intricate and tortuous machinery of legislation [in
order to] . . . . curtail[] to some extent the enormous and pernicious
aggregation of capital in the hands of a limited number of men, to the
danger and disadvantage of the masses of society.121

As with Fortune’s views on education, this view places responsibility for
reform squarely on the shoulders of government as directed through
legislation. Such legislation could be achieved through coalition building
aimed at building a majority united by similar economic interests.
A concern about the dangers of lawless violence surely influences this
argument in favor of government intervention rather than the private
ordering of industrial relations through contests between labor and capital.
In context, it is not difficult to understand why. Not only had the deaths
resulting from the Haymarket Riot occurred just days before, following
waves of strikes that had been marked by increasing violence, but anarchist
elements within the labor movement were becoming stronger at the time
and strikers’ rhetoric and actions were headed increasingly in revolutionary
The Rich and the Poor, supra note 113 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (quoting
Swinton’s paper). Both men struggled enormously with the financial demands of putting out
their papers, contributing large sums of personal funds to their projects and living in great
financial precariousness as a result. These difficulties caused Swinton to abandon his paper
in 1887, and Fortune in 1907.
In yet another similarity, both men also published books presenting their economic
and political analyses of the problems of the day. Compare FORTUNE, supra note 24, with
JOHN SWINTON, A MOMENTOUS QUESTION: THE RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES OF LABOR AND
CAPITAL (Arno Press 1969) (1895). Swinton’s opus, while more engagingly written than
most similar works of the era, displays a naive optimism about the inevitability of social
progress characteristic of books written by white progressives at the time, including some
who would eventually be involved in the founding of the NAACP. See generally WILLIAM
ENGLISH WALLING, THE LARGER ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM (1913) (arguing for the inevitability
of social progress along democratic socialist lines). In contrast, Fortune’s book takes a more
hard-headed and original perspective, gained from synthesizing the rhetoric of class-based
analysis with new insights arising from the perspective of race analysis. See supra Part I.C.2
(discussing Black and White).
121. The Futility of Strikes and Boycots, supra note 119.
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socialist directions.122 To Fortune, who had lived through extreme violence
at the end of Reconstruction in Florida, such rhetoric and uncontrolled
violence must have been disconcerting, to say the least. Moreover, Fortune
was watching lawless violence grow in the form of lynchings and other
outrages against African Americans.123 He could not have failed to make a
connection between this violence and the labor violence taking place at the
same time, especially as employers’ increasing use of African American
strikebreakers directly connected the two forms of violence through white
laborers’ attacks on African American scabs.124 While Fortune refrained
from engaging in blanket condemnations of the labor movement for its
growing Jim Crowism, he seemed unable to convince himself that the path
to greater racial and economic justice lay with the private ordering of
relations between labor and capital through labor agitation.
Fortune was no pacifist—he was fond of a rhetoric calling on African
American men to exert their masculinity through violent self-defense where
circumstances warranted.125 But he was at bottom a believer in the orderly
regulation of relations through government. This is perhaps not surprising
for a child of the Reconstruction Era, disillusioned though Fortune was by
what he lived through during those years. During his formative childhood
years, Fortune had witnessed his father Emanuel Fortune, Sr.’s willingness
to sacrifice material well-being and physical safety to participate in bringing
about a new, more just society ordered through law, and Fortune had
followed a path similar to his father’s in his idealism, material sacrifice, and
commitment to reasoned public debate. That commitment reflects a central
theme in Fortune’s political thought: to Fortune, the achievement of racial
and economic justice depended centrally on government reform through
democratic processes. This vision in turn required faith in a means by
which democratic, majoritarian processes could bring about such reform.
To Fortune, that means was the creation of majoritarian pressure organized
through coalition politics across lines of race and within the common
interests of the working class.
In short, Fortune’s vision of the transformative potential of
democratically enacted public law was a rich one, focusing centrally on
122. For one recent engaging treatment of the background to and events preceding the
Haymarket Riot, see GREEN, supra note 118.
123. According to statistics monitored by Fortune’s friend Ida B. Wells, the number of
“Negroes murdered by mobs” reported by the Chicago Tribune had increased from 52 in
1882 to 164 by 1885. See IDA B. WELLS, Mob Rule in New Orleans, in SOUTHERN HORRORS
AND OTHER WRITINGS: THE ANTI-LYNCHING CAMPAIGN OF IDA B. WELLS, 1892–1900, at 158,
206 (Jacqueline Jones Royster ed., 1997) (detailing statistics).
124. See FONER, supra note 77, at 78 n.†.
125. See, e.g., Shall We Help Ireland?, N.Y. FREEMAN, Jan. 9, 1886 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (arguing that, like the Irish, African Americans should strike back
rather than “run[ning] like a deer”); see also MEIER, supra note 13, at 73 (noting that Fortune
called on African Americans to defend themselves if ejected from first-class coaches,
arguing that “‘one or two murders growing from this intolerable nuisance would break it
up’” (quoting Railroad Villanies, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review))).
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legislative reform. But Fortune at the same time saw a place for legal
reform through court-focused action. To Fortune, defensive litigation was
pressing in the short run in order to stem attacks on civil and political rights.
C. Fortune on Legal Developments in the Courts
With his legal training, Fortune was able to write with sophisticated
understanding and critical insight about the Supreme Court’s civil rights
rulings of the decade. In 1883 alone, the Court issued three important civil
rights decisions, all with devastating results for the reach of the
Reconstruction Amendments and federal civil rights statutes passed
pursuant to them. Fortune wrote passionate denunciations of each of those
decisions. Fortune also frequently reported on incidents of discriminatory
treatment and violence against African Americans, including against
himself and his friends. To oppose these dignitary harms, he championed
the use of test cases, which were being filed experimentally in many parts
of the country on a variety of legal theories.126
The Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence of the late nineteenth
century focused on interpreting the three Reconstruction Era constitutional
amendments: the Thirteen Amendment, which abolished slavery;127 the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that “[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”;128 and the Fifteenth Amendment, which
provided that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”129 In a complex line of cases, the
Court narrowed the reach of these amendments by drawing a line between
public or government action on the one hand and private action on the
126. Beginning even before the 1860s and with growing frequency in the 1870s and after,
African American travelers were filing lawsuits against transportation providers to protest ill
treatment on a variety of grounds, including common-law common carrier doctrines,
admiralty law, the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), and federal civil rights statutes (enacted in 1868
and 1875). It would take me too far afield to discuss the development of legal challenges
and doctrines in this area, but Fortune was well aware of these developments and discussed
the cases with great interest. Excellent scholarly work documenting the frequency and
various theories of these cases includes David S. Bogen, Precursors of Rosa Parks:
Maryland Transportation Cases Between the Civil War and the Beginning of World War I,
63 MD. L. REV. 721 (2004); Patricia Hagler Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender,
and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 993 (1995); Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks
Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855–1914, 13 LAW & HIST. REV.
261 (1995); Joseph R. Palmore, Note, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim Crow:
Race, Transportation, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878–1946, 83 VA. L. REV. 1773
(1997).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
128. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
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other, holding that the language of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments just quoted reached government or state action only.
Fortune’s critique focused on attacking this public-private dichotomy and
pointing out the ways in which the Court’s reasoning eviscerated the
protections promised by the Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights
statutes enacted under them. The three key cases decided in 1883 involved
state inaction—in failure to prosecute private parties for terrorizing
freedmen through acts of violence in order to prevent them from exercising
their newly won right to vote in United States v. Harris;130 in permitting
common carriers to prohibit persons of African American descent from
moving freely on public transportation or availing themselves of public
accommodations in the Civil Rights Cases;131 and in refusing legal
recognition to interracial romantic unions and to children born of such
unions in Pace v. Alabama.132 Fortune pointed out that such state inaction
had the result of denying inherent political and civil rights on account of
race just as profoundly as might acts of state action. In this respect,
Fortune’s thought was a harbinger of the critical legal studies and critical
race studies critiques of the public/private distinction almost a century later.
1. United States v. Harris
Though not often discussed today, United States v. Harris drove the nail
into the coffin of federal prosecutions of private acts of violence against
freedmen attempting to exercise their newly won rights to political
participation. The first case in this line was United States v. Cruikshank,133
which arose from an 1873 massacre of fifty African American freedmen in
Colfax, Louisiana, that has been described as the “bloodiest single instance
of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era.”134 Federal prosecutors
indicted some of the whites involved in the massacre135 under section 6 of
the federal Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870.136 On certificate from the
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that
each of the thirty-two counts of the indictment had a fatal flaw in the
language through which it had been pled. The first count, for example, had
130. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
131. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
132. 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
133. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
134. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
437 (1988).
135. For details of this event, see id.
136. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548. Section 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870
provided that,
if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the
public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to . . . injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise
and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the
constitution or laws of the United States . . . such persons shall be held guilty of
felony.
Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140.

CARLE FINAL

2009]

3/5/2009 6:19:53 PM

RACIAL JUSTICE AND T. THOMAS FORTUNE

1509

alleged that the defendants banded together unlawfully to hinder and
prevent “citizens [of African descent and persons of color] in the free
exercise and enjoyment of their lawful right . . . to peaceably assemble”; the
Court held that such a pleading was too broad because it could reach a
“meeting for any lawful purpose whatever,” rather than solely a peaceable
meeting “for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a
redress of grievances,” which was the only type of meeting that would be
protected as “an attribute of national citizenship.”137
The Court engaged in similar reasoning in invalidating all of the other
counts of the indictment as well. As to counts that charged an intent to
deprive citizens of “lives and liberty of person without due process of law,”
the Court concluded, “It is no more the duty or within the power of the
United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder
within a State, than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder
itself.”138 Even though the indictment had specifically recited that the
citizens at issue were “of African descent and persons of color,” the Court
held this insufficient because “[t]here is no allegation that [the violation
alleged] was done because of the race or color of the persons conspired
against.”139 Likewise, the allegations that the defendants had intended to
“hinder and prevent the citizens named, being of African descent, and
colored,” from exercising “their several and respective right and privilege to
vote at any election” was insufficient because the Fifteen Amendment
protected, not the right to vote, but only “exemption from discrimination in
the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”140 In sum, the Court concluded, each count of the
indictment had failed to specify a violation of any “particular right”
protected by the Constitution.
The Court declared section 6 of the 1870 Enforcement Act
unconstitutional altogether in its companion opinion in United States v.
Reese.141 Reese involved an indictment against inspectors of a municipal
election in Kentucky for refusing to receive and count the vote of “a citizen
of the United States of African descent.”142 The Court, reiterating its
statement in Harris that the Fifteenth Amendment “does not confer the right
of suffrage on any one,”143 held that section 6 of the Enforcement Act was
too broad because its language evinced no “intention to confine its
provisions to the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment.”144
Thus, by the time Harris came before it, the Court had already held that a
Reconstruction Era statute aimed at protecting freedmen from violence was
unconstitutional, and had devised a series of jurisprudential moves that
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551–53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 553–54.
Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
92 U.S. 214 (1875).
Id. at 215.
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883).
Reese, 92 U.S. at 220.
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rendered problematic any attempt to use Reconstruction Era legislation to
protect freedmen, not only from private acts, but even from state action
interfering with their exercise of the political and civil rights supposedly
granted by the Reconstruction Amendments.
In Harris, prosecutors in Tennessee had turned to a different but similar
Reconstruction Era statute, enacted prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1861. Section 2 of that
Act contained a provision very similar to section 6 of the 1870 Enforcement
Act.145 Using this provision, prosecutors had indicted R. G. Harris and
nineteen other whites on charges of conspiring to prevent African American
citizens from voting through acts of violence.146
The Court, relying on both Reese and Cruikshank, first held that the
Fifteenth Amendment could not support the prosecutors’ indictment. As it
had already held in those cases, the Fifteenth Amendment only provided for
an “exemption from discrimination in the enjoyment of the elective
franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” and
not the right to vote.147 The Court also rejected arguments that section 2
could be supported under the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the
amendment “does not add anything to the rights of one citizen as against
another,” but only offered “an additional guaranty against any
encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights” of national
citizenship.148 By its very terms, the Court reasoned, the Fourteenth
Amendment covered only state action; it was never intended to confer “on
Congress the power to enact a law which would punish a private citizen for
an invasion of the rights of his fellow citizen.”149
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment clearly contained no state
action requirement and thus potentially offered the most promise for
reaching private conduct. But the Court rejected the argument that this
amendment could support section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, using
reasoning similar to that it had employed in Reese and Cruikshank. The
Court argued that “the provisions of [section 2] are broader than the
Thirteenth Amendment would justify,” because the statutory provision
could potentially be used to reach conspiracies “between two free white
145. The provision of the 1870 Act, which took effect in 1871, prohibited “two or more
persons within any State or Territory” from conspiring or going “in disguise upon the public
highway or upon the premises of another” for the purpose “of depriving any person or any
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the laws, or . . . hindering . . . any State” from protecting such rights. An Act to
Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871), invalidated by Harris, 106 U.S. at 640–41.
146. Harris, 106 U.S. at 629–30.
147. Id. at 637. The Court asserted that “it requires no argument” to show that the
language of the 1861 Act, “framed to protect from invasion by private persons, the equal
privileges and immunities under the laws,” could not be founded on the clause of the
Constitution whose sole object is to protect the right to vote from “denial or abridgement, by
the United States or states, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Id.
148. Id. at 638.
149. Id. at 644.
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men against another free white man.”150 This possibility that the Thirteenth
Amendment could be read to “accord to Congress the power to punish
every crime by which the right of any person to life, property, or reputation
is invaded,” produced a construction that “is clearly unsound.”151 Thus, the
Court concluded, section 2 was unconstitutional on its face. To the Court at
the time, it did not matter that this specter of overly broad application was
not present on the facts of the case before it, which did involve the
deprivation of political rights to African American citizens.
Fortune’s analysis of United States v. Harris bluntly identified the
consequences of the Court’s decision. As he noted, the decision meant that,
although African Americans could in theory have the ballot, government
was stripped of the power to protect the exercise of it. Fortune understood
the principles of federalism that led to the result, but critiqued the way the
Court had applied them, pointing out the ill effects of holding that
Reconstruction Era statutes could offer no protection against private
violence to the country’s newly enfranchised citizens.152 As Fortune
proclaimed: “There is no law in the United States for the Negro. The
whole thing is a beggardly farce.”153 Fortune also presciently warned that
African Americans should not expect future protection from law. “Having
been made equal before the law by a spasmodic outburst of goodness, we
have got to settle down to that earnest and successful competition which
equality of citizenship imposes.”154 In other words, Fortune believed that it
would be misguided to look to the Court for assistance in the project of
racial advancement; self-help and intrarace solidarity were instead key to
the strategy that conditions demanded.
2. The Civil Rights Cases
Fortune’s observations that legal principles, judges, and the political
parties appointing those judges offered little hope for racial justice were
further confirmed later in the year, when the Court handed down yet
another severe blow to efforts to use federal legislation enacted pursuant to
the Reconstruction Amendments to protect civil rights. In the Civil Rights
Cases,155 the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
provided that all citizens of the United States “shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other

150. Id. at 641.
151. Id. at 643.
152. See, e.g., Civil Rights Laws, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 3, 1883 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review); Is There Any Law for the Negro?, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 17, 1883 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (“While the tyranny which has always flowed from centralized
government is obviated, no check is placed upon the tyranny of the individual state . . . .”).
153. The Ku-Klux Law, N.Y. GLOBE, Jan. 27, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
154. Id.
155. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations . . . applicable alike to citizens of every race and color.”156 Five
cases involving the statute had been consolidated by the Court for joint
review, including four criminal prosecutions of hotels and theaters for
denying access on grounds of race and one suit an African American couple
had filed against a railroad company that had refused the wife access to the
ladies car.157
The Court held the above-quoted provision of the 1875 Act
unconstitutional. Analyzing the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court held that, like the statute in Harris, it impermissibly sought to
regulate action beyond that of the state itself by laying “down rules for the
conduct of individuals in society towards each other.”158 Such an attempt
to regulate social relations, the Court held, was something Congress could
not do: the 1875 Act “is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct;
it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of
admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.”159
Because it had disposed of the issue on this ground, the Court noted, it need
not decide whether the right to enjoy equal accommodations and privileges
in places of public accommodations, entertainment, and transportation “is
one of the essential rights of the citizen which no State can abridge.”160
The Court next turned to the Thirteenth Amendment, acknowledging that
legislation under this amendment “may be primary and direct in its
character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws
establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration” and “clothes
Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing
all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”161 However, the
Court asserted, discrimination on public transportation and in places of
public accommodation and entertainment had “nothing to do with
slavery.”162 The Court rejected arguments linking these forms of
156. Id. at 9 (quoting The Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335,
335–36, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26).
157. Id. at 4–5 (summarizing cases in the Court syllabus). On the significance of gender
in these “ladies car” cases, see generally Welke, supra note 126.
158. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
159. Id. at 19.
160. Id. The Court would reach that question, again with results adverse to the civil
rights cause, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
161. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
162. Id. at 24. The Court further reasoned, with seemingly patently illogical circularity,
that the only proper recourse for a party complaining of discriminatory treatment was “to be
sought under the laws of the State.” Id. But in the earlier case of Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S.
485 (1877), the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited discrimination on
account of color in transportation on the grounds that such legislation amounted to the
regulation of interstate commerce, a power that the Constitution granted exclusively to the
federal government. (On the role of interstate commerce clause analysis in these cases, see
generally Palmore, supra note 126.) Thus it would appear that the states were not
constitutionally authorized to prohibit discrimination in interstate transportation. The Court
further stated that, if state laws “are adverse to [the rights of a person complaining of
discriminatory treatment] and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective
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discrimination to the so-called Black Codes that had existed during slavery,
which barred inns and public conveyances from receiving African
Americans; these had been “merely a means of preventing” escapes of
enslaved persons, and “no part of the servitude itself.”163 Congress had not,
at the time it enacted the Thirteenth Amendment, intended to go so far as to
seek to “adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in the
community[,] but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights
which appertain to the essence of citizenship, . . . the enjoyment or
deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom
and slavery.”164 Just as free persons of color before the abolition of slavery
had enjoyed the “essential rights” of free white citizens but still were
subjected to discrimination in public accommodations and transportation,
“[m]ere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as
badges of slavery,”165 and thus could not be prohibited as such under the
authority of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In dissent, Justice Harlan voiced many of the obvious arguments against
the majority’s opinion. First, he pointed out, slavery had been an institution
that “rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in
bondage,” and thus “their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and
protection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race, in
respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.”166 Pointing
to United States v. Reese and other cases, Harlan noted that “[t]his [C]ourt
has uniformly held that the national government has the power . . . to secure
and protect rights conferred or guaranteed by the Constitution.”167 The
right to be free of discrimination on account of race should apply “in
respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.”168 In
Harlan’s eyes, the rights to free movement on common carriers and in
places of public accommodation or entertainment were civil rights, not
social rights as the majority opinion would have it.
Harlan further disputed the line the Court had drawn between public and
private action. Congress’s power to legislate to remove badges of
inferiority left from slavery should extend to, “at least, such individuals and
corporations as exercise public functions and wield power and authority
under the State.”169 As Harlan noted, corporations such as railroads are
granted special powers under law to carry out public purposes and are
legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State
laws.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24. But it would appear that this was precisely
the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, that the Court was invalidating in its
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, leaving it unclear how Congress could draft the kind of
legislation the Court was positing could be used to protect citizens against race
discrimination.
163. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 25.
166. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 34.
168. Id. at 36.
169. Id.
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subject to state control for public benefit, and, such “being the relations
these corporations hold to the public,” it followed that the right of a person
of color to use the public services provided by such corporations “upon the
terms accorded to freemen of other races, is as fundamental, in the state of
freedom established in this country, as are any of the rights which my
brethren concede to be so far fundamental as to be deemed the essence of
civil freedom.”170
Fortune, needless to say, agreed with Harlan’s analysis and not the
majority’s. In the days following the Court’s ruling, Fortune wrote that the
Globe was “profoundly grateful” to “our friends,” but prepared to return to
“our enemies . . . scorn for scorn.”171 Noting that “only a few months ago”
the Court in Harris had declared the United States “powerless to protect its
citizens in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”
Fortune asked, “[W]hat sort of Government is that which openly declares it
has no power to protect its citizens from ruffianism, intimidation and
murder!”172 Fortune’s critique of the Civil Rights Cases followed the same
lines as those being offered by a number of leading African American
statesmen, including Langston.173 Because the Court’s opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases had focused on rights—or lack thereof—against
discrimination in public transportation and places of public
accommodations, these critiques focused on these aspects of civil liberty as
well. As Fortune wrote,
the Supreme Court now declares that we have no civil rights—declares
that railroad corporations are free to force us into smoking cars or cattle
cars; that hotel keepers are free to make us walk the streets at night; that
theatre managers can refuse us admittance . . . it has reaffirmed the
infamous decision of the infamous Chief Justice Taney [in Dred Scott]
that a “black man has no rights that a white man is bound to respect.”174

The Court’s rulings thus set the course for efforts to improve the citizenship
status of African Americans through the courts. As Fortune and many
others would vividly describe, the reality of race discrimination by common
carriers and places of public accommodations severely curtailed the

170. Id. at 39. Justice John Marshall Harlan proceeded to canvas common-law doctrines
recognizing the quasi-public nature of innkeepers and the relationship between state
licensing and the operation of places of public amusement and he concluded that “such
discrimination practised by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or
quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress may prevent
under its power” under the Thirteenth Amendment as well. Id. at 43.
171. Between Two Fires, N.Y. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
172. The Civil Rights Decision, supra note 120.
173. For a thorough discussion of the responses of many African American statesmen,
journalists, and other leaders to the civil rights cases, see Marianne L. Engelman Lado, A
Question of Justice: African-American Legal Perspectives on the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1123 (1995).
174. The Civil Rights Decision, supra note 120 (quoting Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 407 (1857)).
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mobility and thus the civil freedom of African American citizens.175 As
court-driven law protected these practices, it also necessarily set the nature
of the strategies required for resistance against them. Law was important
because it supported practices with real and important restrictions on the
physical mobility, and thus the basic civic freedom, of African American
citizens. Because the Court had struck down legislative initiatives aimed at
invalidating such practices, it became necessary to develop strategies aimed
at the Court’s jurisprudence itself.
The aspects of civil rights embodied in the ability to enjoy free
movement in transportation, public accommodations, and public
entertainment would continue as a special focus of the reporting in
Fortune’s papers throughout the decade and would also become important
tenets of Fortune’s platform for the Afro-American League, as I discuss in
Part III. This was not so because Fortune thought these aspects of civil
liberty were the complete—or even most important component of the—
solution to the problem of racial injustice. Fortune instead saw the ultimate
solution to racial injustice as tied up in the cause of economic justice, as I
have already explored. Forms of discrimination in transportation and public
accommodations became key issues because they imposed significant
material burdens on immediate lived experience, and thus, presented
concrete issues around which to organize resistance. Fortune and other race
activists sought to reverse the Court’s rulings on these matters as one set of
tangible goals of a movement with a much broader, multifaceted agenda.
3. Pace v. Alabama
Of the Court’s three major civil rights decisions in 1883, the one that
arguably troubled Fortune the most was a less remembered one, Pace v.
Alabama.176 In that case, a unanimous Court177 upheld the constitutionality
of an Alabama statute that made it illegal for any “white person” and any
person of African descent to marry or live in “adultery or fornication”
together, punishable by imprisonment or hard labor for two to seven
years.178 Another section of the Alabama Code prescribed less severe
penalties for adultery and fornication involving persons of the same race.179
The plaintiff, Tony Pace, an African American man, and his wife, Mary
175. In the years to come, even moderate leaders, such as Mary Church Terrell, would
bridle against the hardship imposed by being humiliated during attempts to travel, dine, or
sleep in a place of public accommodation while going about their business. See MARY
CHURCH TERRELL, A COLORED WOMAN IN A WHITE WORLD 295, 300, 384–85, 390–92 (1996)
(describing in detail incidents of humiliation in seeking to travel on Pullman cars, such as
conductors leaving her stranded in strange locations where she could not obtain overnight
accommodations, and being refused service in restaurants and hotels).
176. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
177. This was a key civil rights case in which Justice Harlan failed to dissent. See supra
note 62 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for Justice Harlan’s failure to dissent in
two key civil rights cases of the era).
178. Pace, 106 U.S. at 583 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. (citation omitted).
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Cox, a white woman, had been convicted and sentenced to two years
imprisonment under the statutory provision that applied to interracial
couples, and Pace filed a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, arguing that the
state had denied him equal protection of the laws because it punished him
as a black person more severely than it would a white person for the same
conduct.180
Prefiguring its later decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,181 the Court reasoned
that the Alabama statutes did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection mandate because the state had treated the races equally: both
blacks and whites who engaged in intimate relations across race lines were
punished more severely than persons of either race engaged in
impermissible sexual relations within the same race.182
Fortune’s critique focused on two aspects of the decision, invoking the
vocabulary of both realism and natural rights. Fortune foresaw the harm
both Harris and Pace would do to the race as a whole, the former by
denying protection of the law from harassment and persecution through
violence, and the latter by denying the legality and thus undermining the
stability of relationships into which would be born children to whom
society would assign an African American identity. Fortune also described
the issue as one of natural rights, noting, “[I]t cannot be overlooked, that
when a law prohibits a black man from marrying a white woman, because
of his color, it strikes at the root of natural liberty.”183
In some ways, Fortune seemed more troubled by this case than any other
of the year. With sophisticated critical-legal insight, Fortune pointed out
the way in which the Court’s logic undermined families and defiled African
Americans’ striving for social respectability. The law’s prohibition on
marriage between the parents of children conceived through interracial
sexual unions meant that fathers could not restore respectability to their
children’s mothers even if they wanted to, and it thus all but instructed
fathers to abandon such children. Likewise, the Court had demeaned the
innocent children of such unions by relegating them to mandatory
illegitimacy.
Fortune would return to these decisions repeatedly during the course of
the year, tying their results to the politics of the Court and the nation
generally. No legal formalist, Fortune placed the blame for the Court’s
opinions squarely on the national political parties. According to Fortune,
the opinions were the result of partisan politics and no more, and heralded
the abandonment of African Americans by both Democrats and
Republicans.184
180. Id. at 584.
181. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
182. Pace, 106 U.S. at 585.
183. The Southern Problem, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
184. Troubled Waters, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review); see, e.g., Social Disorders, N.Y. GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1883 (on file with the Fordham
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For all of his antiparty rhetoric, Fortune was an inveterate political
junkie; the pages of his papers were always full of national political
analysis and commentary. That commentary, hardheaded and cynical,
called on African Americans to cease trusting politicians of either party or
any race to help them. Fortune called for African Americans to engage in
self-help strategies—to help themselves through their own efforts and to
distrust outsiders purporting to have friendly or sympathetic intentions,
especially institutions tied to party politics, including the courts. This
theme would undergird his vision for the Afro-American League later in the
decade.
III. FOUNDING THE AFRO-AMERICAN LEAGUE
Fortune’s position as editor of what he had developed into the leading
newspaper of its type gave him an excellent vantage point from which to
observe and develop a sophisticated analysis of political developments.
The national scope of the paper’s reporting gave him detailed knowledge of
events throughout the country, and his interest in and knowledge about
politics led him to comment with authority on developments in the national
parties and electoral campaigns. Because he controlled a paper of relatively
large circulation and excellent reputation, his opinions mattered to African
American public opinion. And because he had legal training and a
sophisticated understanding of law, he was ideally suited to work on
theorizing the relationship between law and race activism. Fortune also had
a platform from which to engage in national-level organization-building
work based on this analysis, and he engaged in that activity as well.
Fortune occasionally suggested forming a national civil rights
organization in his newspaper writings.185 In the spring of 1887, Fortune
published a detailed, thought-out call for the formation of a national
organization to be called the Afro-American League.186 Its motivating
issue was “mob law in the South,” and its strategy would be to “take hold of
the matter ourselves, as the Irish have done” and “[l]et the entire race . . .
organize into a Protective League . . . on the same plan that the Irish
National League is.”187 A month later, Fortune listed six issues such a
national league could immediately address, namely, (1) the “almost
universal suppression of our ballot in the South”; (2) its “reign of lynch and
mob law”; (3) the “unequal distribution of school funds”; (4) the “odious
Law Review) (“[W]e were the stepping stones of ambitious men who treated us with
contempt when we could no longer be used as tools.”); The Civil Rights Decision, supra note
120 (saying that the Republican Party has “tried the faith of the colored man” and “gradually
stripped him of all the rights which had been given to him for his valor,” while the
Democratic Party is “a narrow-minded, corrupt, bloody fraud”).
185. See, e.g., THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 105–06 (describing a 1884 speech by
Fortune); Alexander, supra note 21, at xviii, xxxiii n.42 (describing several 1884 articles).
186. A Proposed Afro-American National League, N.Y. FREEMAN, May 28, 1887 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review). See generally Emma Lou Thornbrough, The National AfroAmerican League, 1887–1908, 27 J. S. HIST. 494 (1961).
187. A Proposed Afro-American National League, supra note 186.
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and demoralizing penitentiary system of the South, with its chain-gangs”
and “convict leases”; (5) the “almost universal tyranny of common carrier
corporations in the South . . . in which the common rights of colored men
and women are outraged and denied”; and (6) “the general policy of those
who conduct places of public accommodation,” involving “matters [that]
reach down in the very life of a people.”188 Fortune hoped (unrealistically,
as it turned out) that the South would be the “stronghold” for organizing
such an organization, because that was where these forms of injustice were
“most glaring and oppressive.”189 It was there that the “colored laboring
masses of that section [were] fast falling into a condition not unlike . . .
chattel slavery,” and “employers of such labor, [were] backed up by ample
legislation and by all the machinery of the law.”190
Fortune’s idea for the Afro-American League occurred in the context of
and in competition among a huge outpouring of organizational efforts of
many varieties; the League was but one of many organizing ideas in play at
the time. National African American conventions had occurred periodically
for many years, including the one Langston had spoken at in 1865, followed
by national meetings in 1869, 1871, and 1873; indeed, such meetings
started several decades before Emancipation.191 This organizing energy
had reached high levels by the 1880s, as Fortune had observed through
reports he was publishing in his newspapers. Fortune reported on the call
for a national colored convention in Louisville in 1883.192 That same year,
there were statewide conventions as well, such as one called by Harry C.
Smith, the highly respected editor of the Cleveland Gazette, and prominent
Republican lawyer Ferdinand Barnett (most famous for his later marriage to
antilynching activist Ida Wells). This call followed from the Court’s
decision in the Civil Rights Cases.193 New England was another frequent
site of such meetings. An 1886 Boston meeting opened with comparisons
to the struggle of the Irish in England: “[T]he 8,000,000 colored Americans
of the United States . . . know what it is to be oppressed, [and] send a hearty
greeting to the Irish people in Ireland, who are struggling to be free from
188. The Afro-American League, N.Y. FREEMAN, June 4, 1887 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. On the national and state African American convention movement, see generally
MEIER, supra note 13, at 4–10 (describing various conventions). As August Meier notes, the
focus of these convention meetings swung between civil rights and economic advancement
and labor issues. Id. at 8–9.
192. Education in the South, N.Y. GLOBE, Sept. 15, 1883 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
193. The Proposed Conference, N.Y. GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1884 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review). The signers of this call explained that they had looked “with alarm upon the
rise and growth of a political despotism in the South arrayed against the exercise of the
constitutional rights and privileges of our kinsmen in that section,” and viewed “with
supreme disgust the seeming indifference and apathy of the General Government.” Id.
Unlike some earlier gatherings, the call disavowed “partisan allegiance[s]” in asking all
sympathizers to come together to work for greater public awareness and education on the
issues at stake. Id.

CARLE FINAL

2009]

3/5/2009 6:19:53 PM

RACIAL JUSTICE AND T. THOMAS FORTUNE

1519

the oppressive policy of the English government . . . .”194 Its theme was
that help for the people must come from within: just as the “Irishman
depends upon the brainy men of his race for leadership,” so too the African
American should stop “pin[ning] his hopes to some slimy, oily, trick[y]
white man for leadership.”195 Ohio, too, formed an “equal rights league”
that year, organized against “laws . . . degrading to colored people” on the
statute books of the several states.196
In Baltimore, the Brotherhood of Liberty was formulating test case
litigation strategies that Fortune would soon incorporate into his list of
priorities for the AAL. The push to focus the AAL on test case litigation
appears to have come first from Baltimore lawyer Joseph Davis.
Explaining that he was drawing on ideas that he and fellow lawyer Everett
Waring had begun to develop through test case litigation in that city,197
Davis wrote to the Freeman urging that the AAL make among its highest
priorities to get statutes off the books that “should be declared
unconstitutional and void.”198 Such test litigation, Davis argued, must lead
the Constitution either to “assert itself or it must confess its weakness and
receive the contempt it may merit from the honest men of all
nationalities.”199
194. Shall We Help Ireland?, supra note 125.
195. Id.
196. Equal Rights League, N.Y. FREEMAN, June 19, 1886 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
197. The Brotherhood of Liberty engaged in a sophisticated, multipronged civil rights
organizing strategy, pursuing such campaigns as test case litigation to protest transportation
segregation and state bastardy laws, successful legislative reform efforts, and a community
defense campaign that included providing legal representation for the defendants charged in
an uprising by exploited African American guano miners in the Navassa Phosphate
Company case. See generally Elaine Kaplan Freeman, Harvey Johnson & Everett Waring, A
Study of Leadership in the Baltimore Negro Community, 1880–1900 (Sept. 1968)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, George Washington University) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review). The Brotherhood was formed in the wake of the 1883 Civil Rights Cases
decision through an alliance between militant Baptist minister Harvey Johnson and several
civil rights lawyers. See id. at 1. Johnson recruited and paid the expenses for two African
American lawyers to apply for admission to the Maryland bar and secured a state supreme
court ruling invalidating, on equal protection grounds, the state’s racial restriction on bar
membership. Id. at 20–24. He then reputedly traveled to Howard Law School to find a
lawyer willing to be a pioneering African American practitioner in the state, where he was
introduced to Everett Waring, who became Baltimore’s first African American lawyer and
head of the Brotherhood’s legal affairs only two weeks after being admitted to the Maryland
bar. Id. at 27–28.
Perhaps because he was not a lawyer, Johnson believed that “process in courts of
law, rather than political agitation” would better promote African-American citizenship
rights. Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also REV. W. M. ALEXANDER, THE
BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY: OR OUR DAY IN COURT, INCLUDING THE NAVASSA CASE (1891)
(pamphlet describing the Brotherhood’s campaigns); Henry J. McGuinn, Equal Protection of
the Law and Fair Trials in Maryland, 24 J. NEGRO HIST. 143, 151–53 (1939) (describing the
Brotherhood’s work in the Navassa case).
198. Davis, supra note 14.
199. Id.; cf. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (describing use of national shaming in the eyes of the world
as a civil rights strategy in the 1950s and after).
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Davis also spelled out the elements necessary for test case litigation to
work. It would be necessary to “follow such cases as are suitable from the
station house to the Supreme Court,” and it would require “the best legal
talent attainable.”200 These lawyers would have to be paid, and paid well.
To support such efforts, the organization formed would have to have a big
membership and with it the “sum[s] of money needed in the legitimate
prosecution of its [objectives].”201 With these words, written in 1887,
Davis in essence outlined the test case litigation strategy that would be
pursued by the NAACP when it was founded almost a quarter century
later.202 At the time, however, this intensively court-focused, and
expensive, test case strategy was only one of many visions and ideas in
play.
Soon Fortune’s columns reported on meetings of local and state leagues
around the country, usually in regions where organizing among race
activists had already occurred. There were local meetings in Boston,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, the District of Columbia, and Cleveland, and
meetings at the state level as well, in states including Kansas, Rhode Island,
and New York.203 Lawyer Frederick McGhee, whom Du Bois would later
credit with the idea for the Niagara Movement,204 called along with others
for the formation of a league in Minnesota.205 In late 1889, Fortune
announced that a date for a national convention had been set for January
1890 in Chicago206 and began using the Freeman to generate turnout to this
important event. Discussion of who should be chosen to lead this new
organization also followed; Langston’s name was floated,207 though in the
end he chose not to attend.
200. Davis, supra note 14.
201. Id.
202. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–
1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 115–28 (2002) (describing NAACP’s early test case
litigation strategies).
203. See, e.g., An Afro-American League, N.Y. FREEMAN, June 11, 1887 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (Boston); The Afro-American League, N.Y. FREEMAN, June 25, 1887
[hereinafter The Afro-American League, June 25, 1887] (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (Baltimore); The Afro-American League, N.Y. FREEMAN, July 9, 1887 [hereinafter
The Afro-American League, July 9, 1887] (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(Louisville); In Readiness for Chicago, N.Y. AGE, Dec. 28, 1889 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio); Kansas State Convention,
N.Y. FREEMAN, Oct. 8, 1887 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Kansas); A League in
Rhode Island, N.Y. AGE, Dec. 24, 1887 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Rhode
Island); League Project Booming, N.Y. AGE, Nov. 16, 1889 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (Syracuse, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., New York, and Knoxville); League
Sentiment Growing, N.Y. AGE, Nov. 9, 1889 (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(Minnesota and Philadelphia); New London Notes, N.Y. FREEMAN, Oct. 1, 1887 (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (New London); Now for Chicago Leaguers, N.Y. AGE, Dec. 7,
1889 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Cleveland).
204. See PAUL D. NELSON, FREDRICK L. MCGHEE: A LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE, 1861–
1912, at 131–32 (2002).
205. League Sentiment Growing, supra note 203.
206. Now for Chicago Leaguers, supra note 203.
207. League Sentiment Growing, supra note 203.
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Cracks in the unified front soon became apparent.208 One involved how
the League would deal with organizations not specifically organized as
leagues. Fortune wanted such groups to declare themselves affiliated with
the AAL, but long-standing local activists had other ideas. Another point of
contention revolved around the organization’s name. Pursuing the analogy
to Irish self-help, Fortune liked the connotations of an “Afro-American”
League, but others wanted to keep the abolitionist-style emphasis on “equal
rights” by using that phrase in the organization’s title. Along with this
difference in the connotations embedded in the organization’s name came
differences in focus. Some protested Fortune’s idea that the organization’s
members be primarily African Americans, to which Fortune responded that
it was not the organization that was drawing the color line because “[t]he
color line is unmistakeably and cruelly drawn already.”209
Fortune found himself explaining in the Age what was special about the
AAL organizing model as opposed to other possibilities. Quickly picking
up on the idea of forcing legal equality as one key distinguishing feature of
the League, Fortune promised that the AAL would not be just “passing . . .
resolutions,” or just endorsing political parties, but instead would have a
“corner-stone . . . contention [of] absolute justice under State and Federal
constitutions.”210
Fortune’s Afro-American League convened in Chicago as planned, in a
national meeting that appears to have been well attended and somewhat
boisterous.211 The delegates endorsed Fortune’s platform basically as
written. A heated debate took place on the Blair Education Bill, with the
delegates in the end passing a resolution that endorsed solely “the principle

208. In his efforts to use his paper to help promote the AAL’s organization, Fortune
proved himself—during this decade at least—amenable to criticism and open debate.
Fortune published many letters and columns supporting the call for the formation of the
League, but published some criticism and dissent as well. See, e.g., The Afro-American
League, June 25, 1887, supra note 203 (urging organization of state league before calling of
national convention); The Afro-American League, N.Y. FREEMAN, July 2, 1887 (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (arguing that the evils the League hoped to address are not
amenable to political treatment); The Florida Facts, N.Y. FREEMAN, Aug. 13, 1887 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (noting that the idea of a League was opposed in Florida);
League Sentiment Growing, supra note 203 (noting that the Christian Monitor thought
league organizing should slow down, while the Bee, a Washington, D.C.-based African
American newspaper, wanted an equal rights league, an idea to which Fortune “[would] not
consent”).
209. J. C. Price, The Afro-American League, N.Y. AGE, Oct. 11, 1890 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
210. Importance of the League Meeting, N.Y. AGE, Jan. 4, 1890 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review).
211. Fortune presided and appeared somewhat hampered by lack of experience in
maintaining order there. See The League Convention, N.Y. AGE, Feb. 1, 1890 (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (reporting that the “uproar which the newspapers chronicled . . .
was of a mild character, the result rather of the desire of each delegate to have something to
say than a disposition to be boisterous,” and describing how a “gavel had not been secured
for the chairman,” so that a delegate had “contributed to the humor of the situation by
handing [Fortune] a hayseed looking umbrella”).
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of Federal aid for education[].”212 The delegates adopted a multilevel
organizational structure—which later would be criticized for being too
unwieldy—and elected heads of a large number of subcommittees.
Respected southern educator J. C. Price was elected League president, and
highly successful Chicago lawyer E. H. Morris was elected attorney of the
League. In another decision later criticized and rescinded, the convention
delegates resolved that holders of political office could not hold national
League offices.
This appears to have been one of the issues that prevented leaders with
political aspirations from attending the AAL convention.213 Just one month
later, in Washington, D.C., an alternative large meeting of a somewhat
different character took place. Attendance at the meeting overlapped with
that of the month before at the Chicago AAL convention, but it featured a
different list of speakers, focused far more heavily on Washington, D.C.’s
African American political elite and leaders with partisan political ties and
histories of holding political office. Langston, now a U.S. congressman
from Virginia, attended and spoke, and delegates endorsed the Blair
Education Bill as well as resolutions urging Congress to enact measures to
protect southern national elections from fraud and to prevent murders of
African Americans for political reasons.214
After the initial flurry of effort and enthusiasm surrounding the AAL’s
first national convention, Fortune faced the much more difficult task of
sustaining a national organization for the long haul. Reports in his paper
testify to his uphill efforts to keep the League’s momentum going. A
number of regional correspondents filed convincing accounts of work in
their areas,215 and some state leagues, especially in New York, reported real
progress in regional initiatives, such as successful efforts in Albany, in
conjunction with other groups, to enact state legislation to strengthen that
state’s civil rights legislation and ban discrimination in insurance.216

212. Id.
213. See Thornbrough, supra note 186, at 499.
214. Opinion Divided in Boston, N.Y. AGE, Feb. 15, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
215. See A League in Rhode Island, N.Y. AGE, July 11, 1891 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (Rhode Island state league); Personal and League Notes, N.Y. AGE, June 6,
1891 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Nebraska and Minnesota state leagues);
Personal and League Notes, N.Y. AGE, May 30, 1891 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, convention).
216. See, e.g., Civil and Public Rights, N.Y. AGE, Apr. 12, 1890 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (New York civil rights legislation drafted by supporters of the New
York League); The Civil Rights Measure, N.Y. AGE, Apr. 26, 1890 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (reporting on hotel industry’s opposition to Albany League’s work on
antidiscrimination legislation as well as introduction of another bill banning discrimination
in insurance); Insurance Discrimination, N.Y. AGE, May 17, 1890 (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (Albany League’s progress on insurance legislation); The New York League
on Deck, N.Y. AGE, Mar. 1, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (New York
League’s work with committee on civil rights); New York State League, N.Y. AGE, May 9,
1891 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (state AAL convention at which Fortune
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Boston’s Equal Rights League sent reports of meetings and resolutions
supporting federal elections legislation and taking other stands,217 and the
District of Columbia, also adhering to its National Equal Rights Association
model, reported on big meetings weighing in on federal elections legislation
proposals at the time.
At the same time, Fortune decided to undertake a test case litigation of
his own. After being ejected from a pub in New York City, Fortune
retained his friend and fellow activist, the lawyer T. McCants Stewart,218 to
file a case under New York’s state law banning discrimination in places of
public accommodations. The front pages of Fortune’s papers began to
feature calls for contributions to Fortune’s legal defense fund. These calls
were never signed by Fortune himself, but instead by other well-known race
leaders.219 At the same time, Fortune and Price were confronting the
difficulty of sustaining a national organization on very limited resources, a
problem that would soon prove fatal to the AAL.
Although local efforts continued much longer,220 the last successful
reports of League activity are full front-page treatments of Stewart’s
arguments in Fortune’s case and then the successful verdict he obtained in
it.221 Booker T. Washington wrote to the N.Y. Age to congratulate his old
friend Stewart, as well as his newer associate Fortune, with whom a
relationship of manipulation through financial dependency would at some
point begin to grow.222
There was little time to celebrate this victory, however. Fortune began to
complain that insufficient funds had been transmitted from state leagues
into the AAL’s treasury to pay the expenses of running the organization.223
By winter, Fortune was refuting as “humbug” claims that the League was
dead, but desperately urged state vice presidents to organize and send in
their payment of one dollar per person to the national office, as he as

spoke); Work of the Albany League, N.Y. AGE, Mar. 28, 1891 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (insurance bill passes).
217. See, e.g., William C. Nell, At the Cradle of Liberty, N.Y. AGE, Aug. 9, 1890 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting on Boston meetings); William C. Nell, Boston’s
National League, N.Y. AGE, July 19, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (same).
218. For more about Stewart, see supra note 116.
219. See, e.g., E. L. Thornton, Fortune Prosecution Fund, N.Y. AGE, Sept. 13, 1890 (on
file with the Fordham Law Review) (reporting that Washington, D.C., leaders T. T.
Simmons, J. E. Bruce, and Robert H. Terrell were involved in raising money for Fortune’s
defense fund).
220. For an excellent investigation into these continuing local efforts, see Shawn Leigh
Alexander, “We Know Our Rights and Have the Courage to Defend Them”: The Spirit of
Agitation in the Age of Accommodation, 1883–1909, at 77–98 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (describing continuing local work by League chapters and supporters in various
parts of the country).
221. See, e,g., Justice, N.Y. AGE, Nov. 14, 1891 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
222. On the beginnings of this unfortunate aspect of Fortune’s relationship with
Washington during this period, see THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 160–61, 171.
223. The League, N.Y. AGE, Oct. 11, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).

CARLE FINAL

1524

3/5/2009 6:19:53 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

secretary “cannot carry the League on his shoulders.”224 By spring of the
next year, there was no money for postage.225 Reports came in of some
organizing efforts in the Midwest and New England, and the New York
organizations’ efforts to enact and strengthen that state’s civil rights
protective legislation continued, but even Fortune could find little positive
news to report about organizing in the South.
The South’s importance led the AAL to decide to hold its next national
convention there, but that decision only exacerbated the organization’s
already flagging status. A much smaller national meeting took place in
Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1891, but few delegates attended.226 Those who
did were forced to brave Tennessee’s separate cars law, giving AAL lawyer
Frederick McGhee facts to pursue a challenge to this statute on breach of
contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress grounds.227
But these steps did not reinvigorate the League. After the Knoxville
meeting, Fortune again insisted that the League was not dead,228 but issued
another urgent call for local leagues to report to the general secretary that
winter. In 1892 no convention was held, and by August 1893 even Fortune
was prepared to announce the AAL’s demise as a national organization.229
The enthusiastic rise followed by the rapid demise of the Afro-American
League at the national level is sometimes described as an unfortunate
failure, but history proves otherwise. As already noted, organizations
dedicated to race advancement came and went with frequency without their
agendas necessarily being set back as a result. Just as the League followed
from prior national equal rights conventions, the organizing efforts leading
to the League laid the groundwork for later efforts. Fortune’s AfroAmerican League played just such a role in the history of the movement for
racial justice, a topic I turn to briefly below.
IV. THE LEGACY OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN LEAGUE IN
LATER RACE ACTIVISM
A. The Afro-American Council
In 1898, five years after Fortune acknowledged that the national AAL
was defunct, AAL founding member Reverend Alexander Walters, along

224. Apathy in the League, N.Y. AGE, Dec. 6, 1890 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
225. What’s the Matter with the League?, N.Y. AGE, Mar. 14, 1891 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
226. T. Thomas Fortune, Personal and Pertinent, N.Y. AGE, July 25, 1891 (on file with
the Fordham Law Review). Fortune claimed this was because delegates did not want to
brave Tennessee’s separate cars law. Id.
227. See NELSON, supra note 204, at 32–34 (describing McGhee’s efforts in this case and
his frustration at the AAL’s lack of successful fundraising for it).
228. See The League Very Much Alive, N.Y. AGE, Aug. 29, 1891 (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
229. Thornbrough, supra note 186, at 501.
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with Fortune and others, revived it under the new name of the AfroAmerican Council (AAC).230 Although there was a substantial overlap in
the membership and leadership of the two organizations, one difference was
salient: Booker T. Washington had by this time emerged in the eyes of
many whites as a fitting national leader, following his accommodationist
speech at the 1895 World’s Fair in Atlanta,231 and he manipulatively and
heavy-handedly sought AAC control. Nevertheless, although the tone of
the AAC’s platform was less militant than that of the AAL, the stated
objectives of the AAC remained substantially consistent with the objectives
of the AAL adopted ten years earlier.232
The AAC’s objectives were listed in a different order than the AAL’s,
and some of their focus and underlying analytical principles had changed,
but the ten “objects” of the AAC listed in its constitution and by-laws
included all six of the AAL’s, ordered as follows: (1) combating lynching;
(2) “testing the constitutionality of laws which are made for the express
purpose of oppressing the Afro-American,” (3) “securing legislation which
in the individual States shall secure to all citizens the rights guaranteed
them by the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution,”233 (4)
“[p]rison [r]eform,” (6) “both industrial and higher education,” and (10)
“[t]o urge the appropriation [of] school funds by the Federal Government to
provide education for citizens who are denied school privileges by
discriminating State laws.”234
Some differences are also obvious. Fortune’s call for attention to wages
had switched to a call for “promot[ing] business enterprises,” and instead of
emphasizing organizing in the South, the AAC “recommend[ed] a healthy
migration from terror-ridden sections of our land to States where law is
respected and maintained.” The AAC’s objectives also placed greater
emphasis on self-help and work by the African American community to
encourage education, to “promote business enterprises among the people,”
and to “inaugurate and promote plans for the moral elevation of the Afro230. For Walters’s detailed account of reviving the League, see ALEXANDER WALTERS,
MY LIFE AND WORK 95–140 (1917).
231. See LOUIS R. HARLAN, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON: THE MAKING OF A BLACK LEADER:
1856–1901, at 217–28 (1972) (describing this speech and its consequences in elevating
Washington’s national reputation).
232. See generally THE NATIONAL AFRO-AMERICAN COUNCIL 15 (Cyrus Field Adams ed.,
1902).
233. Id. The Afro-American Council (AAC) mentioned discrimination as had the AAL,
but that concept was now collapsed into challenges to constitutionality of laws made “for the
express purpose of oppressing the Afro-Americans.” Id. Unlike the AAL’s founding
platform, the AAC’s made no mention of different kinds of discrimination, such as common
carriers and places of public accommodation, and no mention of discrimination carried out
by private actors. The theory for legal challenges to discrimination became exclusively
rooted in constitutional theories rather than referring to both constitutional as well as
contract and tort-based common carrier doctrines, as had the AAL. And the priority given to
bringing test cases had possibly shifted as well: the Council listed it as its second priority,
right under lynching. The emphasis on the oppressive “purpose” of these laws also perhaps
signals a slight shift in or refining of the theory under which such cases would be pursued.
234. Id.
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American people.”235 And in the place of the AAL’s militant demands, the
AAC’s language spoke of investigating and making “an impartial report of
all lynchings,” and working to “educate sentiment on all lines that specially
affect our race.”236
Proper historical assessment of the AAC as a civil rights organization
awaits further inquiry from a new generation of scholars.237 One respect in
which its historical importance is very clear is in its role in providing a
battleground on which militants such as African Methodist Episcopal
Minister Reverdy Ransom—an eloquent spokesperson for views much like
the early Fortune’s, sounding in the social gospel movement, and English or
Fabian socialism blended with militant race analysis238—fought it out with
Washington supporters. Other militants who jumped into this battle within
the AAC included Ida Wells-Barnett,239 former AAL booster Frederick
McGhee,240 militant equal rights advocate and newspaper editor William
Monroe Trotter, who edited the fiercely anti-Washington Boston Guardian,
and other anti-Washington Bostonians.241 Somewhat later, Du Bois, who at
first criticized Ransom’s attacks on Washington, joined the antiWashington bandwagon and began agitating against him in print and in
public remarks as well.242 Convinced that the cause required a complete
break from Washington’s domination and manipulative tactics, Du Bois,
Ransom, McGhee, Trotter, and others formed the idea of establishing a new
independent and militant movement, to be named the Niagara Movement,
after the place of its first meeting in 1905.243
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The standard historical assessment has been to characterize the AAC as never truly
developing legs as an organization. See, e.g., Thornbrough, supra note 186, at 506 (“Torn as
it was by internal dissension and, more important, lacking adequate financial support, the
Council made little progress in carrying forward the fight for racial equality.”). But more
recent scholarship has documented more wide-ranging activities, especially by regional
chapters. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 197, at 106–476 (presenting a detailed and
comprehensive documentation of the activities of the AAC). In this monumental
investigation of both the national- and regional-level activities of the AAC, Alexander’s
dissertation opens important new perspectives in understanding the AAC’s historical
significance and reassessing standard historical evaluations of the organization.
238. On this highly important, but today greatly underappreciated, race leader, who
strongly influenced Du Bois’s later thought and spoke publicly in militant opposition to the
Tuskegee machine some years before Du Bois did, see generally CALVIN S. MORRIS &
REVERDY C. RANSOM: BLACK ADVOCATE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL (1990); Susan Carle,
Vision of Social Justice in the Thought and Activism of Reverdy Ransom in Chicago (Mar.
7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
239. See GIDDINGS, supra note 78, at 403–04, 413–14, 423, 437–39.
240. See NELSON, supra note 204, at 108–11.
241. See FOX, supra note 78, at 30–80.
242. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W. E. B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868–1919,
at 287 (1993).
243. Id. at 297–342. The founding of the Niagara Movement is also reflected in a
treasure trove of original documents organized by archivists at the Du Bois Library at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. See Du Bois Central, Umass Amherst W. E. B. Du
Bois Library, SCUA, http://www.library.umass.edu/spcoll/collections/dubois/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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B. The Niagara Movement
The preparations for the Niagara Movement’s first meeting were carried
out in secrecy in order to avoid it being infiltrated by Washington’s spies.
Fortune was nowhere near the founding meeting, for several reasons. First,
by that point, Fortune’s health and psychological state had drastically
declined as he headed for a total collapse in what we might today call a
nervous breakdown in 1907.244 Second, even if he had been in fighting
form, Fortune was close to the last person, other than Booker T.
Washington himself, who would have been invited to the Niagara
Movement’s secret founding. By then Fortune was correctly perceived as
Washington’s intimate friend and ally, and the Niagara movement “men”—
as all were, on Trotter’s insistence245—were determined to keep
Washington allies away from their meeting.
For these reasons, it is all the more striking that the Niagara Movement’s
1905 Declaration of Principles so closely resembles the AAL’s.246 As did
the AAL, the Niagara Movement, in its Declaration, placed suffrage—and,
more specifically, continuing with the AAL’s emphasis on masculinity
rights, “manhood suffrage”—first on its list.247 Second, the Declaration
protested “against the curtailment of our civil rights,” namely, “the right to
equal treatment in places of public entertainment according to their
behavior and deserts.”248 Next on the Niagara Movement’s list was
“economic opportunity,” and the discussion in its Declaration of this issue
returned to Fortune’s and the League’s analysis of the interconnections
among socioeconomic class, systems of land ownership and economic
production, and private orderings and public law.249 Thus the Niagara
Movement members stated,
We especially complain against the denial of equal opportunities to us
in economic life; in the rural districts of the South this amounts to
peonage and virtual slavery; all over the South it tends to crush labor and
small business enterprises; and everywhere American prejudice, helped
often by iniquitous laws, is making it more difficult for Negro-Americans
to earn a decent living.250

244. See THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 304–06.
245. For more on William Monroe Trotter’s opposition to allowing women to join the
Niagara Movement as regular members see supra note 78.
246. Fortune would later complain that Du Bois had stolen his ideas in drafting the
AAL’s founding documents when he drafted the Niagara Movement’s Declaration of
Principles. See THORNBROUGH, supra note 22, at 269–70. A comparison of the two
documents suggests he was right; indeed, it made good sense for Du Bois to start the process
of drafting founding principles for a new organization by working from similar documents
drafted by organizations that had come before. Id.
247. See THE NIAGARA MOVEMENT: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1905) [hereinafter
NIAGARA MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.library.umass.edu/spcoll/digital/
dubois/312.2.839-01-07.pdf.
248. Id. at 1.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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On education, the Niagara Movement called on the state to provide this
basic resource to all Americans: “Common school education should be free
to all American children and compulsory.”251 This analysis of education
moved away from the emphasis the AAL and the AAC had placed on the
national government’s role, and called for both state and federal
government to step up to the plate.252
In other parts of the three-page-long declaration, the Movement called for
“abolition of the dehumanizing convict-lease system,”253 and the
recognition of African American rights to decent housing and health: “We
plead for health—for an opportunity to live in decent houses and localities,
for a chance to rear our children in physical and moral cleanliness.”254
The Niagara Movement also protested discrimination:
“Any
discrimination based simply on race or color is barbarous.”255 As the
League had, it singled out for protest the system of “‘Jim Crow’ cars, since
its effect is and must be to make us pay first-class fare for third-class
accommodations, render us open to insults and discomfort and to crucify
wantonly our manhood, womanhood and self-respect.”256 The Niagara
Movement addressed the connections between race and labor problems
about which Fortune had written so much.257 Finally, just as the young

251. Id.
252. Id. at 1–2 (noting that “[w]e urge an increase in public high school facilities in the
South, where the Negro-Americans are almost wholly without such provisions,” and “[w]e
believe that, in defense of our own institutions, the United States should aid common school
education, particularly in the South, and we especially recommend concerted agitation to this
end”).
253. Id. at 2.
254. Id. Here, interestingly, the issue of decent housing—a very pressing one in light of
the denial of good housing to African Americans in most parts of the country, see, e.g.,
TERRELL, supra note 175, at 113–19 (describing housing discrimination she and her
distinguished husband faced in Washington, D.C.)—was not framed as a discrimination
analysis but rather in the vocabulary of social rights.
255. NIAGARA MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES, supra note 247, at 2.
256. Id. Note that here the analysis of various aspects of the wrong of discrimination in
public accommodations was separated into several theories. One was contract or common
carrier analysis: one should get what one pays for. Another was the grievousness of the
affront to dignity rights. Yet a third was the affront to African American masculinity and
femininity specifically.
257. Id. (“We hold up for public execration the conduct of two opposite classes of men:
The practice among employers of importing ignorant Negro-American laborers in
emergencies, and then affording them neither protection nor permanent employment; and the
practice of labor unions in proscribing and boycotting and oppressing thousands of their
fellow-toilers, simply because they are black. These methods have accentuated and will
accentuate the war of labor and capital, and they are disgraceful to both sides.”).

CARLE FINAL

2009]

3/5/2009 6:19:53 PM

RACIAL JUSTICE AND T. THOMAS FORTUNE

1529

Fortune had, the Niagara Movement declared its militancy258 and called for
agitation.259
The Niagara Movement’s Declaration of Principles also echoed some of
the AAC’s themes260 and added ideas that were not in the terser and more
rudimentary founding platform of the League.261
The Niagara Movement’s existence as an organization was brief.
Financial troubles and bickering by some of its members, especially the
prickly Trotter, led it to cease meeting in any large-scale way within a few
years of its formation. But as was the case with the AAL, the ideas
hammered out through the formative period of the Niagara Movement were
passed along to new organizations.
This next time, the ideas of the Niagara Movement, inherited in
substantial part from Fortune and the AAL, went into a forum that was in
some ways more problematic and complicated because this movement—
first called the National Negro Conference, a year later to become the
NAACP—was, during its first decade, heavily dominated by wealthy
whites. This meant, on the one hand, involvement by donors with financial
resources and connections based on centuries of race privilege that could
support the hiring of paid staff and otherwise provide resources to keep the
fledgling organization on its feet through its early years. But it also meant
that those wielding power within the organization lacked first-hand
experience with racial oppression and held what appear through

258. Id. (“We refuse to allow the impression to remain that the Negro-American assents
to inferiority, is submissive under oppression and apologetic before insults. Through
helplessness we may submit, but the voice of protest of ten million Americans must never
cease to assail the ears of their fellows, so long as America is unjust.”).
259. Id. at 3 (“Of the above grievances we do not hesitate to complain, and to complain
loudly and insistently. . . . Persistent manly agitation is the way to liberty, and toward this
goal the Niagara Movement has started and asks the co-operation of all men of all races.”).
260. See, e.g., id. (urging “upon Congress the enactment of appropriate legislation for
securing the proper enforcement of those articles of freedom, the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States,” and “corresponding duties
upon our people,” including duties to vote, respect the rights of others, work, obey the laws,
be clean and orderly, send children to school, and to respect ourselves).
261. These included protesting the unfair and unequal treatment of African Americans in
the military and “the increase of a desire to bow to racial prejudice” in the nation’s churches.
The Niagara Movement called for “upright judges” and “juries selected without
discrimination on account of color,” and for “the same measure of punishment and the same
efforts at reformation for black as for white offenders,” as well as for “orphanages and farm
schools” and “juvenile reformatories for delinquents.” Id. at 2–3.
This last platform was probably included on the suggestion of founding member
William H. H. Hart, a Howard University law professor from 1890 until 1922, who also
operated a farm school for African American orphan boys until Congress discontinued its
appropriation to the District of Columbia to fund that endeavor, prompting Hart to enter into
a prolonged litigation battle against the federal government. See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
NEGRO BIOGRAPHY 294 (Rayford W. Logan & Michael R. Winston eds., 1982); L. M.
Hershaw, William H. H. Hart, 19 J. NEGRO HIST. 211 (1934) (obituary notes). Hart was the
victorious plaintiff in Hart v. Maryland, 60 A. 457, 463 (Md. 1905), in which the Maryland
Court of Appeals struck down that State’s separate car law because it posed an undue burden
on interstate commerce as applied to interstate passengers.
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contemporary eyes to be sometimes problematic attitudes about their
relative superiority in relation to the group they were setting out to serve.262
C. The Founding of the NAACP
The NAACP is often referred to as having been founded primarily by
whites,263 but this assumption is belied by a closer look at the transmission
of the substantive founding platform of the NAACP. Such an examination
shows that the new organization’s ideas came straight from the Niagara
Movement and the African American organizations that preceded it, with
some adjustments largely made in order to educate and explain the issues to
a biracial membership. In addition, many of the African Americans who
played significant roles in the NAACP’s organizing meetings or were on its
founding committee or first board of directors had been members of the
AAL, the AAC, or the Niagara Movement.264
The discourse throughout the 1909 founding conference sounded in the
English-style socialism favored by Fortune, Ransom, Du Bois, and other
progressives of both races during the period. Du Bois, for example,
emphasized foremost the importance of the right to vote, for which all
African Americans were united in demand,265 and at the same time
emphasized the problems of industrial conflict between African Americans
and working class whites. This conflict, Du Bois perceived, “accentuates
race prejudice; when a whole community, a whole nation, pours contempt
on a fellow-man it seems a personal insult for that man to work beside me
or at the same kind of work.”266 Thus, Du Bois argued, the “first result[] of
the denial of civil rights is industrial jealousy and hatred.”267 Moreover, he
pointed out, if white workers have the vote and African Americans do not,
262. On the racial attitudes of the NAACP’s founders, see generally Glasberg, supra note
9.
263. See, e.g., id. at 65 (“[T]he roots of the NAACP lie far indeed from the Black militant
thrust of the turn of the century . . . .”).
264. These included Bishop Walters, Fortune’s co-signer of the call to found the AAL
and later president of the AAC, as well as Ida Wells-Barnett, one of the more militant voices
within the AAC, and Mary Church Terrell, a more moderate AAC member who was invited
onto the NAACP’s first Executive Committee. From the Niagara Movement came founder
W. E. B. Du Bois, who would go on to edit the NAACP journal, The Crisis, from 1910 until
1934; L.M. Hershaw, a D.C. intellectual who had worked with Du Bois in editing the
predecessor publication The Horizon and joined the NAACP’s 1910 General Committee;
Morehouse College President John Hope, Du Bois’s friend from Atlanta; as well as Chicago
dentist and race activist Charles Bentley, appointed to the NAACP’s first board of directors.
In addition, the Niagara Movement’s one white member, Mary White Ovington, played a
key role in the NAACP’s founding and continued to be deeply involved in the day-to-day
operations of the national organization for many years. See generally CAROLYN WEDIN,
INHERITORS OF THE SPIRIT: MARY WHITE OVINGTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NAACP
(1998).
265. See W. E. B. Du Bois, Politics and Industry, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
NEGRO CONFERENCE 1909, at 79–82 (William Loren Katz ed., 1969) [hereinafter NATIONAL
NEGRO CONFERENCE].
266. Id. at 83.
267. Id.
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white workers can “enforce [these] feeling[s] of prejudice and
repulsion.”268
So too, virtually all of the whites who spoke at the founding conference
were committed to various forms and degrees of progressivism-merginginto-socialism of a mild democratic sort. Thirty years had passed since
Fortune had read and been inspired by Henry George, John Ruskin, Karl
Marx, and the English socialists, but the NAACP’s white founders had read
many of the same works and were committed to many of the same ideas.
William English Walling, the secretary of the founding committee and a
southerner by birth and background,269 echoed Du Bois’s emphasis on
economic class, seeing “two Souths, those who employ Negro labor and
those who compete with it.”270 He argued, “The white workingmen must
be persuaded that their only permanent welfare is co-operation with their
colored fellow-workers and that opposition must inevitably lead to total
demoralization of all organized effort of both classes.”271 In the ensuing
discussion period, Reverend Waldron agreed, opining that, “unless
something is done to change things, the poor white man not only of the
South, but particularly in the South, is going to feel the pinch of the shoe
just as much as the Negro.”272 In a paper Waldron delivered later in the
day, he called on “the Negro” to “make common cause with the working
class which to-day is organizing and struggling for better social and
economic conditions,” noted that “[t]he old slave oligarchy maintained its
ascendency largely by fixing a gulf between the Negro slave and the white
free laborer,” and argued that the “Negro . . . must see that the cause of
labor is his cause.”273
Oswald Garrison Villard, the conference convener, outlined a program
for organizing a strong permanent body to grow out of the conference.
Villard urged the organization to establish a “political and civil rights
bureau,” which “would bend its energies to bringing about the enforcement
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” and “obtaining court
decisions upon the disfranchising laws and other discriminatory

268. Id. at 84.
269. See William English Walling, The Negro and the South, in NATIONAL NEGRO
CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 98.
270. Id. at 101.
271. Id.
272. Discussion, in NATIONAL NEGRO CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 110, 110
(statement of Rev. J. Millon Waldron).
273. J. Milton Waldron, President, Nat’l Negro Am. Political League, The Problem’s
Solution (May 31, 1909), in NATIONAL NEGRO CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 159, 164–65.
Niagara Movement founding member William Trotter then reiterated the importance of the
understanding of the connections between race and class that had been previously made.
“The existence of color lines in industrial matters is calamitous,” Trotter pointed out. In the
South, in particular, he noted, white workers were turning out African American workers
wherever they could. “And why is this?” Trotter posed; because the African American is
disenfranchised. See NATIONAL NEGRO CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 113 (statement of
William M. Trotter).
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legislation.”274 Assuring that with the right connections such a board
“would have no difficulty in raising” large sums, Villard proposed that the
organization set as one of its goals to “have at its disposal sufficient money
to employ the highest legal talent obtainable” and cover “the heavy cost of
carrying up to the Supreme Court case after case.”275 With these resources
available to carry on a more sustained assault, Villard envisioned that the
Court, which he characterized as “that shifting and evasive body,” would
finally be “compelled to decide whether there shall be two degrees of
citizenship in this country.”276
The resolutions adopted by the 1909 committee echoed these priorities277
and outlined three “first and immediate steps,” namely: “(1) That the
Constitution be strictly enforced and the civil rights guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment be secured impartially to all”; “(2) That there be
equal educational opportunities for all and in all the States, and that public
school expenditure be the same for the Negro and white child”; and “(3)
That in accordance with the Fifteenth Amendment the right of the Negro to
the ballot on the same terms as other citizens be recognized in every part of
the country.”278
Thus the NAACP was launched, and would go on to play an important
role in the civil rights movement as it moved through the twentieth century.
That history involves a much longer, more complicated story, of course, but
in important ways begins with T. Thomas Fortune and his Afro-American
League. Tracing the long and multifaceted roots of the civil rights

274. Oswald Garrison Villard, The Need of Organization (June 1, 1909), in NATIONAL
NEGRO CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 197, 203.
275. Id. at 202–03.
276. Id. at 203. Similarly, on the issue of lynching, which he brought up first in his
presentation, Oswald Garrison Villard proclaimed, “Never has a race needed more a strong
central legal bureau able to employ the ablest counsel to prosecute men who kill and call it
law.” Id. at 201. Such a bureau would stand “ever ready to insist upon the punishment of
guilty officials” and could also “cure the lynching evil by prosecuting lax authorities and
bringing civil suits for damages against the local or county authorities.” Id. at 201–02. And
Villard also envisioned an education bureau, which would seek to uplift the standards of
Negro schools and colleges; as well as an industrial relations bureau, which would “deal
with the colored man in relation to labor.” Id. at 204. Thus Villard’s proposal hit all of the
main elements of the AAL’s founding platform:
education, lynching, labor,
disenfranchisement, and discrimination. See id. at 201–04.
277. The resolutions further “denounce[d] the ever-growing oppression of our 10,000,000
colored fellow citizens,” and stated,
The systematic persecution of law-abiding citizens and their disfranchisement on
account of their race alone is a crime that will ultimately drag down to an infamous
end any nation that allows it to be practised, and it bears most heavily on those
poor white farmers and laborers whose economic position is most similar to that of
the persecuted race.”
Charles Edward Russell, Address, in NATIONAL NEGRO CONFERENCE, supra note 265, at 220,
222. They also listed the issues of persecution of organized workers, peonage, enslavement
of prisoners, and disfranchisement of “large bodies of whites in many Southern States”; and
demanded “for the Negroes, as for all others, a free and complete education.” Id. at 222–23.
278. Id. at 223–24.
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movement’s motivating ideas should thus include locating their origins in
Fortune’s thought and activism of the 1880s.
CONCLUSION
The AAL, the AAC, the Niagara Movement, and the early NAACP all
clearly embraced demands for what we would translate today as “formal”
equality in civil and political rights. Fortune was staunchly in favor of
abolishing race segregation in schools, a view he shared with some but not
all of the race leaders of his time. He wrote in enthusiastic support of using
courts for test case litigation to challenge segregation and other ill-treatment
of African Americans by common carriers and places of public
accommodation and amusement. He argued tirelessly about the importance
of fighting against the dignitary harms of such Jim Crow practices and laws.
These are all ideas today associated with legal liberalism, and it would
simply be a gross distortion of the historical record to portray these
priorities as anything less than central to race activists’ agenda in the 1880s.
But this does not mean that race activists thought about court-centered
action on issues such as transportation segregation in legal liberalist terms.
To the contrary, as I have shown, Fortune combined calls for courtcentered strategies with calls for legislative reform to create a more just
economic order. He thought such reform could be achieved through the
creation of interracial coalitions based on commonalities of class interest.
He further thought that the ultimate cause of justice rested in the
elimination of poverty and severe economic disadvantage for all citizens
regardless of race.
Fortune’s ideas about the connections between racial and economic
justice obviously no longer fit the requirements of our times. Turn-of-thecentury utopian socialism cannot compete with the inexorable press of neoliberalist ideologies pushing toward global economic development with
little regard for the suffering of the economically disadvantaged. But in
thinking about paths forward in promoting greater justice—around race,
around class, within the United States and globally—it may be well to pick
up some of the skeins of analysis lost along the way in the twentiethcentury struggle for racial justice in the United States. Some of those
skeins sought to knit together various types of analysis, including analyses
of the problems of race and class; and of civil and political rights, on the
one hand, and economic justice, on the other. More of that knitting may be
very much needed in the face of the compartmentalized analytical and
political activity in which social justice activists and intellectuals are
engaged today.

